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Introduction
This dissertation seeks to contribute to the literature on behavioral industrial organization
by incorporating important psychological traits of human behavior into classic economic
models. We analyze how these psychological traits can explain market observables, in a
way consistent with available empirical evidence.
The psychology literature has identied two important psychological traits that, when
interpreted in economics settings, may contribute to explaining the behavior of economic
agents. On the one hand, agents (workers) have a sense of self-achievement, caring about
their e¤ort being acknowledged independently of whether it is compensated for. On
the other hand, agents (consumers) may su¤er from temptation, being tempted to buy
products they would like to commit ex-ante not to choose. In both cases, the behavior
of the agents consumers or workers is modied because options that do not result in
a monetary pay-o¤, either because the options are not chosen or because the payo¤s
are implicit, end up mattering to the agents. Exploring the implications of such payo¤s
require that we depart from standard economic models as these predict that only the
o¤ers that the agent may choose matter.
The rst chapter of this dissertation studies, within a principal-agent model, the prop-
erties of the optimal contract when workers have a sense of self-achievement. The second
and third chapters study a sellers optimal pricing products when selling horizontally
di¤erentiated products to consumers who su¤er from temptation.
Self-Achievement and Goal Setting
Economic theory has emphasized the importance of stick and carrotpolicies, such as
ring threats and wage compensation schemes, as being the most e¤ective way to induce
workers to exert e¤ort. Recent developments in psychology and behavioral economics,
however, have identied that the non-nancial terms of a labor contract may also a¤ect
the workersproductivity. In particular, psychologists have found evidence, both in the
workplace and in laboratory settings, that performance goals that are independent of
monetary compensation a¤ect the employeesincentive to work and hence their perfor-
mance. Locke & Latham (2002) nd that the probability that performance increases after
a goal has been set is above 90%. They argue that goals have an energizing e¤ect, as
more challenging goals induce more e¤ort. As Latham (2000) states: "no other theory of
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motivation has been found to be as consistently e¤ective in the workplace as goal setting."
In "Make it Challenging: Motivation through Goal Setting", I provide a theory that
is consistent with this evidence. While the standard principal agent model would tell us
that payo¤-irrelevant information should not result in higher prots for the rm since it
is irrelevant to the worker, the psychology literature has concluded that workers do have
a sense of self-accomplishment and may care about pay-o¤ irrelevant goals. Accordingly,
I modify the standard model of managerial incentives by introducing workers who, in
their preferences, have a sense of self-achievement. Within my setting, natural economic
questions arise. Can a manager increase the workersproductivity by making the job
more challenging? How should the manager dene the workers goals? What are the
determinants of job satisfaction?
In this model, agents have two types of incentives. First, as in standard settings, agents
work in response to extrinsic incentives, which in my model are pay-per-performance
wages. Second, agents have an intrinsic motive to work because they derive an internal
sense of achievement by accomplishing challenging goals. Therefore, by setting a goal
that is hard but attainable, the principal may provide the agents with an intrinsic mo-
tivation to work and enhance their performance.1 Agents, however, di¤er in what they
nd challenging and rewarding, which we formalize as the personal standard. The per-
sonal standard determines the intensity of agents intrinsic motivation to achieve goals.
Heterogeneity in the personal standard requires that di¤erent goals be set for di¤erent
agents.
With this framework, I show that the production of each agent, as well as the goals
set by the principal, increase with the agents standard at the optimal contract. In
consequence, payo¤ irrelevant goals work by increasing the rms prot beyond the prots
that the classical principal with no goals can earn. In terms of the agentsself-achievement,
I establish two results. First, I show that the utility of the high type agent is an inverted
U-shaped function of his standard, which implies that the most satised agent is a high
type with a mid-ranged standard. Second, I show that a mid-ranged agent type could be
the most satised. In fact, although the highest type produces the most, he can also get
a zero utility. Both results are consistent with available empirical evidence establishing
1As Frey (1997) argues, there are at least two kinds of work motivations: extrinsic and intrinsic. The
extrinsic motivation is based on incentives coming from outside the worker such as his wage. The intrinsic
motivation, instead, comes from inside the worker, and yields no reward except the work itself.
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that the most demanding people can be the least satised (see Locke & Latham (2002)).
Temptation and Horizontal Di¤erentiation
In Chapters II and III of this dissertation, I seek to understand the pricing and product
o¤ering implications of consumers having preferences with temptation. I characterize the
supply decision of a monopolist that sells products that are horizontally di¤erentiated to
consumers who su¤er from temptation.
Consumers who su¤er from temptation have dynamically inconsistent preferences as
ex-ante they evaluate ex-post choices with preferences that are di¤erent from their prefer-
ences ex-post. A good example is a consumer who su¤ers from temptation when shopping
at the grocery store. Ex-ante he would like to commit to consuming healthy, low calorie
groceries, but he anticipates that, ex-post, he will bias his choices towards unhealthier
alternatives (if available). As a result, ex-ante, the consumer increase his willingness to
pay if the rm o¤ers a menu that excludes tempting products. Reducing the size of the
menu, however, implies a trade-o¤ for the rm as it limits the scope of price discrimination
and the prots the rm can earn.
A natural way to model dynamically inconsistent preferences is by using the "tempta-
tion representation" in Kreps (1979). A consumer has preferences ex-ante (when writing
his shopping list) for his choices ex-post but anticipates that ex-post (once at the store)
he is tempted his preferences change with a positive probability. We can interpret this
preference representation as if the consumer had, ex-post, two possible di¤erent selves: a
tempted and a committed self, which occur stochastically.
In the eld of Industrial Organization, some papers have analyzed how rms would
modify their supply decision if they were selling to consumers who su¤ered from temp-
tation, but they have only considered the case where the products are vertically di¤er-
entiated (see Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) as well as Esteban et al. (2006)). Instead, in
the marketplace, product di¤erentiation also takes place horizontally. As we will see,
considering this other dimension of product di¤erentiation will yield new and di¤erent
insights.
With vertical di¤erentiation, all consumers have the same ranking of the products
by quality. Instead, with horizontal di¤erentiation, consumers di¤er on what their ideal
product is. In Chapter II and III of this dissertation, I study a monopolists supply decision
when selling products that are horizontally di¤erentiated to a population of heterogenous
consumers who su¤er from temptation. I use the Hotelling framework, with consumers
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being heterogeneous in their ideal products on the Hotelling line, to model horizontal
di¤erentiation and represent temptation with a change in the consumersideal product.
In Temptation, Horizontal Di¤erentiation and Monopoly Pricing, I consider a con-
tinuous distribution of consumer types over the Hotelling line and the rm being able to
o¤er all products on this line. If there were no temptation, the monopolist would o¤er
as many products as consumer types there are and locate a product on the ideal point of
each consumer type. With temptation, however, the rm faces a di¤erent trade-o¤: for
those consumers who have the most divergence between their temptation and commitment
ideal products, locating a product close to the consumers ideal point with temptation
increases utility in this state but decrease ex-ante utility, lowering his incentives to partic-
ipate. I show that, because of this trade-o¤, in the optimal menu, the rm may exclude
products that are too close to the ideal tempting product. As a result, in equilibrium,
two groups of consumers form: consumers with similar preferences in the two states who
consume the same product in both states, and consumers with diverging preferences, who
consume di¤erent products. Both the size of the two consumer groups, which determines
the degree of product diversity, and the prot of the rm decrease with the probability of
temptation.
These results raise a natural question: Would having a discrete number of consumer
types yield new and di¤erent insights? In the third chapter, "Temptation, Horizontal
Di¤erentiation and Monopoly Pricing: The Discrete Types Case", I show that having a
nite number of consumer types creates a new source of distortion. In equilibrium, the
rm induces consumers to choose a product that is not their ideal product. In other
words, temptation not only restricts product diversity but also distorts the optimal menu
by not o¤ering the consumersideal products.
This dissertation has been written to make the chapters self-contained. As a result,
each chapter has its own abstract and introduction. For notational convenience, the
number of the chapter is included in the numbering of Lemmas, Propositions, etc.. Lemma
I.2, for example, is Lemma 2 in Chapter I. For the ease of the exposition, Appendices
and References are relegated to the end of the document. Any reference across chapters
is made explicit
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Chapter I
Make it Challenging: Motivation
through Goal Setting
Abstract: We study a principal agent model where agents derive a sense
of pride from accomplishing production goals. As in classical models, the
principal o¤ers a pay-per-performance wage to the agent, determining the
agents extrinsic incentives. However, in our setting, the principal also wishes
to set goals that a¤ect the agentsintrinsic motivation to work. Agents di¤er
in their personal standards which determines what becomes challenging and
rewarding to them, and hence the intensity of their intrinsic motivation to
achieve goals. We show that, at the optimal contract, the agentsproduction,
as well as the goals set by the principal, increase with the agentspersonal
standards. Thus, although goal setting is payo¤ irrelevant since it does not
directly a¤ect agentswage, it does increase agentsachievement and hence
the principals prots. Moreover, we show that an agent with mid-ranged
standard could end up being the one most satised (JEL: D82, D86, M50,
Z13)
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The object of living is work, experience, and happiness. There is joy in
work. All that money can do is buy us someone elses work in exchange for our
own. There is no happiness except in the realization that we have accomplished
something. Henry Ford, founder of the Ford Motor Company.2
I.1 Introduction
In 1968, the American Pulpwood Association became concerned about how to increase
its loggersproductivity as mechanization alone was not increasing the productivity of its
logging crews. Two Industrial Organization psychologists Edwin A. Locke and Gary P.
Lathamassured the rms managers that they had found a way to increase productivity
at no nancial expense to anyone. The policy seemed too easy; it merely involved setting
specic production goals for the loggers. The novelty was that these goals were wage
irrelevant, in contrast with classical wage relevant goals such as bonuses. The psycholo-
gists argued that introducing a goal that was di¢ cult but attainable, would increase the
challenge of the job while making it clear to the workers what was expected from them.
Although the managers were quite skeptical at the beginning, the results were surprising:
the performance of logging crews increased 18% and the rms prots rose as well.3
This example was followed by many studies in the psychology literature on what is
known as "goal setting" (e.g., Yukl & Latham (1978), Shane et al. (2003), Anderson et
al. (2010)).4 The theory states that performance goals are an important determinant of
employeesmotivation to work and hence a¤ect their productivity.5 (See Locke (1997)
and Locke and Latham (2002) for a literature review.)
Our purpose in this paper is to take these kind of motivation theories only addressed
2This and other Henry Ford quotes are available at http://www.iwise.com/R5gdr.
3We can nd this study in Latham & Locke (1979), which also includes similar empirical evidence for
the case study with typists.
4In management literature, goal setting is known as "management by objectives" (MBO). Several stud-
ies nd empirical evidence that MBO programs improve workersperformance (e.g., Ivancevich (1974),
Bush (1998) and Mosley et al. (2001)).
5The goals studied in this literature as well as the one that we use in this paper, are non-binding goals
since they do not a¤ect the workerswage. Therefore, these goals do not directly a¤ect the principals
prots (i.e., they are payo¤ irrelevant). In contrast, binding goals (bonuses for example) a¤ect the agents
wage so they are payo¤ relevant.
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in psychology and management and make them precise in standard economic theory. In
particular, we propose a model where workers do have a sense of self-accomplishment and
may care about pay-o¤ irrelevant goals. This sense of accomplishment is di¤erent for
workers with di¤erent personal standards, which is private information to them. Thus, a
worker with a high personal standard can only be motivated to accomplish a su¢ ciently
challenging (di¢ cult) goal.6
Before describing the key elements of the model, we start by summarizing the main
ndings in the goal setting literature. The most important and robust nding is that the
more di¢ cult the goal is, the greater the achievement will be. This result applies as long
as the individual is committed to the goal (i.e., he cares about it) and has the ability
to attain it.7 The reason why goals a¤ect workersachievement is that goals a¤ect the
challenge of the job and hence the satisfaction workersobtain from the work itself. As
Judge (2000) says:
The most e¤ective way an organization can promote job satisfaction of
its employees is to enhance the mental challenge in their jobs, and the most
consequential way most individuals can improve their own satisfaction is to
seek out mentally challenging work.8
Therefore, goals are an important determinant of workerssatisfaction because they
help develop a sense of achievement. According to the goal setting literature, goals serve as
a reference point of self satisfaction, with harder goals leading to better accomplishments.
6We can think of alternative explanations of the goal setting evidence. For instance, a goal may be
an implicit benchmark for being retained or for future promotions. However, it is important to clarify a
couple of things. First, regarding evidence in the workplace like our previous loggers example, the goal
setting policy signicantly increased performance even when the supervisor was not present. In this case
the supervisor could only observe the crews performance as a whole, but not the individual performance
of each worker. Second, there are numerous laboratory experiments showing that individuals who have
been assigned a specic goal solve more arithmetic problems or assemble more tinker toys than do people
without goals (See Locke (1997)). Therefore, the evidence indicates that there is an important component
of employees motivation through goal setting policies that cannot be explained with classical economic
models only.
7Our models set-up allows that higher goals lead to lower achievement. However, under certain
conditions this may not happen in equilibrium.
8Timothy A. Judge, Promote Job Satisfaction through Mental Challenge in The Blackwell Handbook
of Principles of Organizational Behavior (2000, Chapter 6, page 107).
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Since goals are reference points, it is also plausible that a higher goal lowers the
workerssatisfaction. In fact, supporting this reasoning, Mento et al. (1992) have found
that those who produce the most, those with di¢ cult goals, are the least satised.9 The
question then is why do people accept these goals? According to Locke and Latham
(2002), the driving force behind this result is that those people with high goals demand
more from themselves, thus they are dissatised with less. Therefore, their personal
standards are set at a higher level.10 Similarly, Locke, Latham & Erez (1988) nd in
an experiment that individuals accept goals if these goals are higher than their personal
standard and reject them otherwise. According to this evidence goals a¤ect the challenge
of the job di¤erently depending on the individuals standards.
Finally, an important empirical fact is that demanding goals are more e¤ective with
those workers whose personal standards are high. In other words, people who demand
more of themselves are the most committed to high goals.11
The previous ndings are di¢ cult to support with traditional economic models, such
as the classical principal agent model, in which only the goals that are directly linked to
the agentswage (e.g., bonuses) a¤ect their incentives to work. Our purpose here is to
ll this gap by introducing goal setting into an economic model of managerial incentives.
Therefore, we look at the following questions: Can a manager increase the workerspro-
ductivity by using goals that are linked to the jobs challenge? How should the manager
dene the workersgoals? What are the determinants of job satisfaction?
To answer these questions we propose a principal agent model where the agents mo-
tivation to work is twofold. First, as in standard models, the agent works in response
to extrinsic incentives, which in our model are a pay-per-performance wage. Second,
the agent has an intrinsic motivation to work because he derives an internal sense of
9This result applies for both, "self set" and "assigned" goals. However, it is important to remark that
through the paper we consider assigned goals instead of self set goals. Therefore, people with di¢ cult
goals are people who have accepted jobs with high goals instead of people who have set a high goal for
themselves in their jobs.
10Another example is that even if we consider researchers with the same ability. We usually observe
that some of them need to publish their papers in very high ranked journals in order to get a sense of
self-achievement while others are happy publishing in low ranked journals.
11There are other results in the goal setting literature that we do not describe because they are beyond
the scope of this paper, such as the denition of specic or explicit goals, the inuence of the individuals
self-condence on the level of the goals accepted, or the importance of feedback showing progress for the
e¤ectiveness of the goal.
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achievement from accomplishing goals.12 Coming back to our introductory example, we
can easily imagine harvesting timber to be a monotonous and boring task. However, as
we have seen, by setting demanding but attainable production goals, the managers were
able to increase the challenge of the job and provide the loggers with a sense of accom-
plishment that increased their intrinsic motivation to work and hence their performance.
In this paper, we capture this e¤ect with a goal payo¤ function, which measures the
intrinsic satisfaction that an agent receives from his production with respect to the goal
set by the principal. Thus, an agent gets a positive goal payo¤ if he produces above and
beyond the set target but a negative goal payo¤ otherwise. Workers, however, di¤er in
their perception of how challenging goals may be. For instance, we may observe that for
loggers who demand more from themselves, only those goals that require a greater amount
of timber to be harvested will be found challenging. On the other hand, those loggers
who demand little from themselves, lower goals may be just as challenging. We model
this goal commitment e¤ect with a reference dependent function in which the reference
point is the agents own standard. In particular, we consider the standard as the point
up to which an agent considers the goal to be challenging and thus obtains a positive goal
commitment.13
In our model, agents di¤er only in their personal standards. Hence, agents with
di¤erent standards can be motivated di¤erently by the same goal because some of them
may consider it to be challenging while others do not. Therefore, the principal will
design di¤erent contracts (with di¤erent goals) for di¤erent agent types. We show that
at the optimal contract, goals are met by agents and thus they derive a positive intrinsic
utility. We also show that the agentsproduction as well as the goals set by the principal
increase with the agentsstandard. Thus, in our model, goals that are non-binding for the
agent, i.e., they are payo¤ irrelevant for the principal, increase the principals prots with
respect to the classical principal agent model with no goals. As in classical principal agent
models, the principal distorts the low types contract in such a way that his production
decreases with the standard of higher types. With respect to the utility that agents get in
12As Frey (2001) argues there are at least two kinds of worker motivation: extrinsic and intrinsic. The
extrinsic motivation is based on incentives coming from outside the worker such as his wage. However,
there are other intrinsic motives coming from inside the worker, and that apparently give no reward
except the work itself.
13In our model, personal standards do not matter unless there are goals. As we shall see, if the principal
does not assign goals, the agents have no intrinsic motivation to work. This is a simplifying assumption.
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equilibrium, we show two important results. First, in our two types model we show that
the utility of the high type is an inverted U-shaped function of the agents standard. Thus,
the most satised agent is a high type with a mid-ranged standard. Second, in a three
types case we show that a mid-ranged agent type could be the one most satised. In fact,
although the highest type achieves the highest production he can receive a zero utility.
The intuition is as follows, if the highest types standard is su¢ ciently high he does not
consider the goals assigned to the other agents to be challenging, thus his informational
rents are zero.
While in recent years the problem of goal setting has become an extremely popular
topic in psychology and management, the idea of goals that are not linked to the workers
wage may have an economic e¤ect which thus far has received very little attention. Some
exceptions deserve to be mentioned. Some papers study the e¤ects of a self-set goal
to attenuate the self-control problems of dynamically inconsistent agents. For instance,
Hsiaw (2009) studies an optimal stopping problem (or a project termination decision) with
hyperbolic discounters in which there is an option value of waiting due to uncertainty.
In her model, goals, which act as a reference point up to which agents get an additional
positive utility, induce more patient behavior by providing an additional incentive to
wait for a higher realization of the projects value. Therefore, the main result is that
endogenous goal setting attenuates the impulsiveness of an agent with present-biased
time preferences. In our model we use assigned goals in a principal agent model, which
makes our research questions and ndings completely di¤erent.
Köszegi and Rabin (2006) study a model of reference dependent preferences, where
the reference point is a persons rational expectations about outcomes. According to
this theory, agents are inuenced by a "gain-loss sense" that a¤ects the maximum price
they are willing to pay. For instance, if a consumer expects to buy a pair of shoes, she
experiences a sense of loss if she does not buy them, and this sense of loss increases
the maximum price she is willing to pay for the shoes. Daido & Itoh (2007) introduce
these preferences in an agency model. They show that under risk aversion, the agents
higher expectation allows the principal to implement greater e¤ort with lower-powered
incentives. Moreover, they obtain the two types self-fullling prophecy: the Galatea and
the Pygmalion e¤ect. In the former an agents self-expectation about his performance
determines his actual performance, while in the latter the principals expectation about
the agents performance has an impact on the agents performance. Although, as in our
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model, they study a principal agent model with agentsreference dependent preferences,
the focus of Daido and Itoh (2007) greatly di¤ers from ours. Firstly, the results of a
principal agent model with agentspreferences á la Köszegi and Rabin (2006) can only vary
from the standard model if there is common uncertainty about the production function
(moral hazard) and not in an adverse selection setting like ours. And more importantly, in
our model the agents reference point (i.e., the goal) is a decision variable of the principal
rather than the agents rational expectations. This allows us to incorporate goal setting
as a part of the principals motivation policy.
Finally, this paper is related to the models that account for the individualsintrinsic
motivation to work. For instance, Bénabou & Tirole (2003) study a principal agent model
in which the principal has better information than the agent about the agents type. The
authors show that, although performance incentives lead to an increment of the agents
e¤ort in the short run, they are negative reinforcements in the long run. The idea is
that if the principal pays a bonus to induce low ability agents to work (i.e., the principal
increases the agents "extrinsic" motivation), then the agent perceives the bonus as a
bad signal about his own ability (which reduces his "intrinsic" motivation). Some papers
have also studied the optimal incentive contract when agents have intrinsic motivation.
For instance, Fischer & Huddart (2008) study a model where the agentscost of e¤ort
is determined by a social norm; this social norm makes agents work harder in response
to an increment in the average e¤ort of their peers. These norms inuence the power of
nancial incentives within an organization. In contrast with this literature, in our model
the principal has a more active role since he can directly inuence the agents intrinsic
motivation by setting the reference point of his intrinsic utility.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. In Section 3
we analyze the principal agent relationship by characterizing the optimal contract and
studying the two types and the three types cases. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
I.2 The Model
We study a principal agent model with one risk-neutral employer, the principal, and one
worker, the agent. The principals utility is given by the output produced by the agent,
y, minus the wage she has to pay, w.
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Output is given by the production function y = e, where e is the agents e¤ort and
 is the agents ability (i.e., his level of human capital).14 The agents disutility of e¤ort,
c (e), is a convex function. For simplicity, we assume c (e) = e
2
2
. We assume  is observable
so that, by observing output, the principal can infer the agents e¤ort. Thus, we abstract
away from moral hazard concerns. The principal o¤ers contracts that are pairs fw; gg,
where w is the wage and g is a production goal. We consider a pay-per-performance wage,
w (y), whereas the production goal is a non-binding goal since it does not directly a¤ect
the agents wage. We assume that the principal has all the bargaining power so that the
contract is a take-it-or-leave-ito¤er.
In this model, there are two ways to motivate the agent to work: an extrinsic motiva-
tion, which is the di¤erence between the wage and the disutility of e¤ort, and an intrinsic
motivation, which is the agents sense of pride in having accomplished goal g with the
production y. Therefore, in our setting, challenging goals play the role of inducing the
individualspride. Moreover, we consider that goals a¤ect the challenge of the job dif-
ferently depending on what the agents demand from themselves. We capture this e¤ect
with the personal standards parameter, s, which is private information for the agent, so
there is an adverse selection problem. We denote by V (y; g; s) the agents intrinsic utility
function and specify the agents utility function as
U = w (y) + V (y; g; s)  e
2
2
:
We assume that the intrinsic utility function is of the form V (y; g; s) =  (g; s) v (y; g)
if g > 0 and V (y; g; s) = 0 if g = 0.15 Where  (g; s) is the agents goal commitment,
i.e., the intensity of the intrinsic utility, and v (y; g) is the agents goal payo¤. The
goal payo¤ function v (y; g) is the satisfaction that the agent derives from accomplishing
output y, when his production goal is g. In order to get closed-form solutions we assume
that v (y; g) = g ln

y
g

: This function satises the following properties consistent with
empirical facts in the psychology literature:16
(i) Goal dependence: v (y; g)  0 if and only if y  g;
14We use a standard technology where  and e are complements. Thus, the greater the agents ability,
the greater the agents e¤ort productivity. Similar results can be obtained using an additive function
where  and e are independent.
15From the argument below it is clear that function v (y; g) is not dened for g = 0. However, lim
g!0
v (y; g) = 0. Therefore, function V (y; g; s) is continuous for all g  0.
16See Locke (1997) and Locke and Latham (2002).
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(ii) Monotonicity: v1 (y; g) > 0;
(iii) Complementarity: v12 (y; g) > 0; and,
(iv) Concavity: v11 (y; g) < 0.
Property (i) says that the agent obtains a positive goal payo¤ as long as he meets
the goal. Property (ii) says that, for any goal, the agents goal payo¤ increases with
output. Property (iii) states that goal and output are complements. Therefore, the more
di¢ cult attaining the goal is, the greater the marginal payo¤ from attaining it will be.17
Finally, property (iv) says that the agents goal payo¤is concave in production. Therefore,
the marginal goal payo¤ decreases as the gap between the agents output and the goal
increases.18
As we mentioned in the introduction, a necessary condition for goals to inuence an
agents performance is that agents are committed to those goals. Although the individuals
goal commitment is a complex theme in the related literature, here we choose an easy
and intuitive modelling strategy. The goal commitment is determined by the interaction
between goals and personal standards; high personal standards require challenging goals
in order for the agent to take pride in accomplishment.19 Formally, the goal commitment
function,  (g; s), is a reference dependent function, where s is the reference point. For
17Atkinson (1958) nds that if the goals increment is impossible to attain (or the individual believes
that it is impossible), the performance can indeed decrease. Although this "inverse-U" relationship
between output and goals is very intuitive, under our conditions that goals may be di¢ cult but attainable
a complementarity relationship may best t with the evidence (see Locke (1997)).
18Imagine for instance that a researcher has the goal of publishing three research papers in top journals.
Therefore, he gets a positive intrinsic satisfaction if he attains it whereas he su¤ers if he fails to do so
(property (i)). Moreover, his satisfaction increases with the number of papers published (property (ii)).
Obviously, the sense of achievement from attaining this research goal would be lower with an easier goal
such as publishing one paper in a lower ranked journal (property (iii)). Finally, if the researcher has
already published ve papers, the increment in his intrinsic utility if he produces another one is lower
than if he only has two or three papers (property (iv)).
19There are other determinants of individuals goal commitment that we do not consider here. For
instance, there is empirical evidence that core self-evaluations such as self-steem or self-regard, a¤ect
the individualsgoal commitment (See, Judge et al. (1998)). Another important determinant of goal
commitment is the individualsparticipation in the goal setting process (See, Anderson et al. (2010)).
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simplicity we consider the following step function:
 (g; s) =
(
s if g > s;
s if g  s:
From here on we say that an agent with standard s considers goal g to be challeng-
ing when g > s. In the next proposition, we show an important property of the goal
commitment function.
Proposition I.1 In equilibrium de

dg
 0 if and only if s  s.
If the goal commitment is greater with a challenging goal than with a non-challenging
one, the agents e¤ort does not decrease with the assigned goal. The intuition is simple,
since higher goals increase goal commitment, agents are more motivated to get goal payo¤,
so they work harder in response to goals. As we have already mentioned, the most
consistent empirical fact in the goal setting literature is that agents exert greater e¤ort
in response to more challenging and attainable goals. Therefore, from here on, we shall
assume that the function  (g; s) satises:
(v) Challenging goals are motivational: s  s = 0:20
Note that because of assumption (v), an agent with standard s considers goal g to
be challenging (g > si) if and only if he is committed to it, i.e.,  (g; s) > 0. This is
an intuitive property stating that di¢ cult tasks are motivational,21 and it is consistent
with the ndings of Mento et al. (1992) and Locke and Latham (2002) discussed in the
introduction, in which the agentsstandards are the reference points of their (intrinsic)
satisfaction. Moreover note that our goal commitment function satises another empirical
nding which was discussed in the introduction,
(vi) Demanding agents are more committed to challenging goals:  2 (g; s)  0 i¤ g > s.
20Our main results still apply if we consider a more general function where s  s > 0.
21A similar interpretation would be that a strong commitment to goals is attained when the agent is
convinced that they are important, and demanding agents only consider challenging goals to be important
(Locke (1997) page 119).
By Joaquín Gómez Miñambres Page: 19
Essays on Behavioral Economics
As we will see in the next section, this property is important in order to sort agents
types.
Therefore the agents utility function is given by
U =
8<: w + sg ln

y
g

  e2
2
if g > s;
w   e2
2
if g  s:
(I.1)
Note that U is discontinuous. If g  s, the agent obtains zero intrinsic utility; whereas,
if g > s, he obtains positive intrinsic utility when y > g. Thus, in order to get a positive
intrinsic motivation (V (y; g; s) > 0), an agent not only needs su¢ ciently high production
(y > g) to receive a positive goal payo¤, but also a su¢ ciently high goal (g > s) to get a
positive goal commitment.
The principal does not observe the agents standard, thus, we have an adverse selection
problem. For simplicity we begin by assuming that the personal standard can take two
values s 2 fsL; sHg, where s = sH with probability p. In Section 3:4, we extend the
analysis to three agent types.
I.3 The Principal-Agent Relationship
We begin the analysis by characterizing the optimal contract o¤ered by the principal to
an agent with goal dependent preferences. Applying the revelation principle, the principal
designs one contract for each agent type, fw; gg = f(wL; wH) ; (gL; gH)g. Let us dene
U (si; sj) = wj + V (yj; gj; si)  e
2
j
2
as the utility of an agent with standard si choosing the
contract o¤ered to an agent with standard sj. The principal chooses a wage structure w
and sets production goals g that induce e¤orts e = (eL; eH) to maximize expected prot
subject to the agents participation (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints.
Thus, the principals problem is
max
fw;gg
p(yH   wH) + (1  p) (yL   wL)
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subject to, for all i; j 2 fL;Hg
wi + V (yi; gi; si)  e
2
i
2
 0; (IR)
wi + V (yi; gi; si)  e
2
i
2
 wj + V (yj; gj; si) 
e2j
2
: (IC)
Our rst result states that the agent gets a non-negative intrinsic utility in equilibrium.
Lemma I.1 Given a contract fw; gg, in equilibrium V (yi; gi; si)  0:
The intuition is simple: if agents get a positive intrinsic utility from their job, it is
easier to make them participate. If agents receive a negative intrinsic utility, the principal
has to pay them higher wages to assure their participation. This can be avoided if the
principal o¤ers non-challenging goals (gi  si) to the agents in such a way that they are not
committed to goals ( (gi; si) = 0) : Thus, their intrinsic utility is zero (V (yi; gi; si) = 0).22
In order to solve the model, we need to identify a monotonicity or single crossing
condition for the utility function that allows us to sort agent types. Note that this is
not obvious in our environment because of the discontinuity of the utility function. We
rst show that the agent with the high standard will be the one who obtains the highest
surplus in equilibrium.
Lemma I.2 Given a contract fw; gg, in equilibrium U (sH ; sH)  U (sL; sL) :
By Lemma 2, we can apply standard results in principal agent models which state that
the individual rationality of the low type, IRL, and the incentive compatibility constraints
of the high type, ICH , are binding in equilibrium. Because of this, the next proposition
follows.
22Therefore, this result is a consequence of our assumption that s = 0. Thus, agents get zero goal
commitment,  (g; s), when goals are not challenging for them (gi  si). If s > 0, it is possible that in
equilibrium V (yi; gi; si) < 0 for some agent i. Therefore, we should study more cases, but our qualitative
results would remain unchanged.
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Proposition I.2 Given a contract fw; gg, in equilibrium, IRL and ICH bind, i.e.,
U (sL; sL) = 0; and
U (sH ; sH) = U (sH ; sL) =
8<: gL ln

eL
gL

(sH   sL) if gL > sH ;
0 if gL  sH :
The low type agent gets zero surplus in equilibrium, and the high type obtains infor-
mational rents when the low types goal is challenging for him (i.e., gL > sH). Otherwise,
the high type agent receives no intrinsic utility from taking the low type contract. Thus,
the principal does not need to pay him informational rents.
The next lemma provides a useful result regarding the agentsintrinsic utility in equi-
librium.
Lemma I.3 Given a contract fw; gg, in equilibrium, for all i 2 fL;Hg,
(i) V (yi; gi; si) > 0 if and only if yi > si;
(ii) V (yi; gi; si) = 0 if and only if yi  si:
By Lemma 3, we know that the agent gets a challenging job in equilibrium, and hence a
positive intrinsic utility, if and only if the agents production is greater than his standard.
This is because when y > s, the principal can design a goal which is both challenging
(g > s) and can be successfully accomplished by the agent (y > g). Note that this is
the best situation for the principal because IR constraints are relaxed and the principal
can o¤er lower wages. However, if y < s, there is no way to design a goal that is both
challenging and can be successfully accomplished by the agent. In this case, the principal
prefers to o¤er non-challenging goals in order to avoid negative intrinsic utilities.
Since y = e; by Lemma 3, it is immediate that when the agents ability, , is high,
the principal can always o¤er a challenging goal to both agent types. This is the content
of the next corollary.
Corollary I.1 Given a contract fw; gg and the agents standard si, if  is su¢ ciently
high, in equilibrium, V (yi; gi; si) > 0 for all i 2 fL;Hg.
To simplify the analysis, from here on we assume that the condition in Corollary 1
holds, so that agents are intrinsically motivated in equilibrium.23
23In the appendix we study the cases that do not satisfy the condition of Corollary 5. We skip these
cases here because results are very similar and the intuitions are the same.
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Before setting the equilibrium contracts, we begin by studying the two cases that may
arise in equilibrium (see Proposition 2): an informational rents case, in which the high
type agent gets a positive utility in equilibrium, and a rent extraction case, in which both
agents obtain a zero utility in equilibrium.
I.3.1 The Informational Rents Case
As a starting point, we assume that there is an equilibrium in which the low types goal
is challenging for the high type agent (gL > sH), so that he gets positive informational
rents. Then, applying Proposition 2, we have
U (sH ; sL) = gL ln

eL
gL

(sH   sL) > U (sL; sL) = 0:
Therefore, the equilibrium of the model is given by the solution to the principals
problem, where the binding constraints can be rewritten as
wL =
e2L
2
  sLgL ln

eL
gL

; (IRL)
wH =
e2H
2
  sHgH ln

eH
gH

+ gL ln

eL
gL

(sH   sL) : (ICH)
Denoting by e Eulers number, the solution to the principals problem is
eH = 

1 +
sH
e

and gH =


e
2
(e+ sH) ;
eL = 

1 +
sL   psH
(1  p) e

and gL =


e
2
e+
sL   psH
(1  p)

:
Figure 1 shows some comparative statics. We x the standard of the low type and we
plot the results as a function of the high type standard. This allow us to see the e¤ect of
the high type standard on the low type contract and hence the informational rents.
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Figure 1. The solution with positive informational rents
Since Corollary 1 is satised, i.e., agents are committed to goals in equilibrium, it is
immediate that the principal sets goals that maximize the agents goal payo¤ given his
production, gi = argmax
g
: v (yi; g), thus gi =
yi
e
. Therefore, the principal sets goals that
agents can accomplish, yi > gi. The idea is that the principal uses goals to maximize the
agents intrinsic utility in order to pay lower wages. As we can see in Figure 1, the high
types e¤ort, eH , as well as his goal, gH , increase with his standard, sH . The rationale
behind this result is clear: as the agentsstandards increase, the principal o¤ers them
jobs with demanding goals. By doing so, the principal motivates agents to work hard so
that they can reach a high production level. For the low type, both his e¤ort and his goal
decrease with the high type standard, sH . The principal distorts the contract o¤ered to
the low type in order to extract greater surplus from the high type. As sH increases, the
high type is more important than the low type for the principal, so he further distorts
the low type contract. For the same reason, the lower the proportion of high types, p,
the lower the distortion of the low type contract will be. In fact, if p = 0, there is no
distortion at all.
We can see in Figure 1 that as the high types standard increases, the production of
the high (low) type increases (decreases) at a higher rate than his assigned goal. Thus, in
equilibrium, the intrinsic utility of the high (low) type agent is an increasing (decreasing)
function of the high types standard.24 Therefore, the principal distorts the low types
contract so that his goal payo¤, v (yL; gL), decreases with sH .
24These results hold true if assumptions (i) and (ii) on the function v (y; g) hold.
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Regarding the high types informational rents, we have the following trade-o¤: On the
one hand, as the high types standard increases, the agents goal commitment increases
as well. This has a direct positive e¤ect on the informational rents. On the other hand,
we have a negative e¤ect, since the greater the high types standard is, the more will be
the principals distortion of the low types contract, so that the utility extracted by the
high type when choosing the low type contract is lower. Formally, the informational rents
function is v (yL; gL) (sH   sL), where the second part is increasing in sH and v (yL; gL)
decreases with sH as we have just shown. Due to the concavity of the goal payo¤ function,
the negative e¤ect dominates the positive e¤ect when sH is su¢ ciently high. This is the
intuition of the inverted U shape of the informational rents function illustrated in Figure
1.25
To complete the characterization of the contract, we depict the equilibrium wages in
Figure 2.
Figure 2. The wages with positive informational rents
Let us recall that from IRL that
wL =
e2L
2
  V (yL; gL; sL) :
Thus, the low type agents wage equals the disutility of e¤ort minus his intrinsic utility.
As we have seen, the low type agents e¤ort, as well as his goal and his intrinsic utility,
decrease with the high types standard, sH . Due to the concavity of the intrinsic utility
25We can easily check that with a linear goal payo¤ function the informational rents function is concave
and increasing in sH .
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function and the convexity of the disutility of e¤ort, the reduction of the intrinsic utility
e¤ect dominates the reduction of e¤ort e¤ect if sH is su¢ ciently high, so that wL has a
U-shaped form.
Similarly, from ICH ,
wH =
e2H
2
+ U (sH ; sL)  V (yH ; gH ; sH) :
Thus, the wage of the high type agent equals the disutility of e¤ort plus the informational
rents minus the intrinsic utility. As we know, the high type agents e¤ort, as well as his
goal and intrinsic utility, increase with sH . If sH is su¢ ciently high the intrinsic utility
e¤ect dominates the increment in the disutility of e¤ort and the informational rents e¤ect,
so that wH presents an inverted U-shaped form.
Note that if sH is su¢ ciently high wages are negative. It is immediate that an agent
with no intrinsic motivation (i.e., V () = 0) and zero productivity (i.e.,  = 0) receives a
zero wage in this model. Therefore, a negative wage means that an intrinsically motivated
agent could get a lower wage than an agent with no intrinsic motivation.26
I.3.2 The Rent Extraction Case
Here we study the case in which the low type goal is not challenging for the high type
(gL  sH) whereas the high type is given a challenging goal (gH > sH). Therefore, the
informational rents are zero. Note that this case is equivalent to the perfect information
case. Moreover, remember that because of Corollary 1 the agents get a challenging goal
(g1 > si) in equilibrium. Hence we can rewrite the IRL and ICH constraints as
wL =
e2L
2
  sLgL ln

eL
gL

; (IRL)
wH =
e2H
2
  sHgH ln

eH
gH

: (ICH)
Therefore, the solution of the principals problem is, for all i 2 fL;Hg
ei = 

1 +
si
e

;
gi =


e
2
(e+ si) ;
26Note that in our model an agent with no intrinsic motivation always gets a zero utility in equilibrium.
However, an intrinsically motivated agent may get a positive utility in the form of informational rents.
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For both agent types, the e¤ort, ei, as well as his goal, gi, increase with his standard,
si. In this case, the low types contract does not depend on the high types standard. In
other words, the principal does not distort the low types contract as in the previous case.
I.3.3 The Optimal Contract
In this section, we characterize the optimal contract o¤ered by the principal. Proposition
2 states that one of the two cases studied above may arise in equilibrium: the informa-
tional rent case and the rent extraction case. While in the former the low types goal is
challenging for the high type agent, and hence he gets positive informational rents, in the
latter the low types goal is non-challenging for the high type and thus the principal can
extract the entire surplus of both agentstypes. Let us consider the informational rents
case depicted in Figure 1. In this case, the high type agent is committed to the low types
goal, thus gL > sH so that  (gL; sH) > 0. As sH increases, gL decreases, therefore there
is sH = sI such that both variables coincides. Thus  (gL; sH) = 0, which is the rent
extraction case.
Note that, in equilibrium, the goal o¤ered to the high type agent, and hence his e¤ort,
has the same functional form independently of whether he gets positive informational
rents or not, while the contract of the low type is di¤erent in the two situations.27 The
next gure illustrates the low types production and his assigned goal as well as the
informational rents as a function of the high types standard, sH .
27This is the standard "non distortion at the top, distortion at the bottom" result in adverse selection
models.
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Figure 3. Low type equilibrium.
Thus, if sH 2 (sL; sI), we are in the informational rents case; whereas, if sH  sI ,
we are in the rent extraction case. If sH 2 [sI ; sII ], we have a corner solution in which
gL = sH , while if sH > sII then gL > sH .28 The next proposition fully characterizes the
equilibrium.
Proposition I.3 Given p 2 (0; 1) and sL  0, the optimal production goals are
gH =


e
2
(e+ sH) , gL =
8>><>>:
 

e
2 
e+ sL psH
(1 p)

if sH 2 (sL; sI) ;
sH if sH 2 [sI ; sII ] ; 

e
2
(e+ sL) if sH > sII :
While the optimal e¤orts provided by agents are
eH = 

1 +
sH
e

, eL =
8>><>>:


1 + sL psH
(1 p)e

if sH 2 (sL; sI) ;
+
p
4sLsH+
2
2
if sH 2 [sI ; sII ] ;

 
1 + sL
e

if sH > sII ;
where sI =
2(sL+e(1 p))
p2+e2(1 p) and sII =
 

e
2
(e+ sL).
28All the technical details are relegated to the Appendix, in which we additionally provide the solution
of the cases that violate the condition of Corollary 1, for all of which the high type agent gets zero
informational rents.
By Joaquín Gómez Miñambres Page: 28
Essays on Behavioral Economics
The optimal contract gives the maximum informational rents to the high type agent
when he has an intermediate standard. This result arises for two reasons. Firstly, because
of the inverted U -shaped informational rent function discussed previously, thus if sH is
su¢ ciently high with respect to sL, the principal distorts the low type contract so much
that the informational rents decrease with sH . Secondly, because if sH  sI , the low type
goal designed by the principal is not challenging for the high type and so his intrinsic
utility when taking the low type contract (i.e., the informational rents) is zero. Therefore,
an agent gets a zero surplus if he is a low type, or he is so demanding that the low type
goal is not challenging enough to derive pride in accomplishing it.
It is straightforward to show that in our principal agent model with no goals, which
leads to V () = 0, the e¤ort exerted by the agent is e = . In our model we have shown
that while goal setting is payo¤ irrelevant since it does not directly a¤ects the agents
wage, it does increase the agents output and hence the principals prots. Moreover we
have shown that the higher the agents standard, the greater the principals prots will
be.
I.3.4 The Three Types Model
Here we show that the model can be easily extended to a three types case, i.e., s 2
fsL; sM ; sHg with sH > sM > sL > 0. First of all, we can check that Lemma 1, Lemma 3
and hence Corollary 1 apply as well to the three types case.29 For simplicity we consider
that the condition of Corollary 1 satises such that in equilibrium V (yi; gi; si) > 0. In
the next proposition, we nd which constraints bind.
Proposition I.4 Given a contract fw; gg = f(wL; wM ; wH) ; (gL; gM ; gH)g, in equilib-
29These results are a consequence of our goal dependent utility function specication rather than the
number of agent types.
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rium, IRL and ICM;L and ICH;M bind, i.e.,
U (sL; sL) = 0;
U (sM ; sM) = U (sM ; sL) =
8<: gL ln

eL
gL

(sM   sL) if gL 2 (sM ; sH) ;
0 if gL  sM :
U (sH ; sH) = U (sH ; sM) =
8<: gM ln

eM
gM

(sH   sM) if gM > sH ;
0 if gM  sH :
Therefore, our previous results with two agent types are robust to the case of three
types. Note that, when gL 2 (sM ; sH) and gM  sH , the medium type will obtain positive
informational rents while the high type will not. Hence, with three consumer types, a
mid-ranged agent (not only a mid-ranged standard of the high type as before) could be
the most satised.
Note that in the classical principal agent model the highest type, the most productive
one, has the highest informational rents. However, in our model, the agent who produces
the most the one with the highest standard may have zero informational rents when
he does not consider lower goals to be challenging. In other words, being very demanding
can be detrimental.
There is evidence of this e¤ect. In an experiment with undergraduate students, Mento
et al. (1992) found that the highest degree of satisfaction is reached by students with a
grade goal of C (i.e., students with a mediocre standard) while the lowest one was attained
by students with a grade goal of A (i.e., students with a very high standard). Our results
are in line with this empirical evidence.
I.4 Conclusion
Psychologists and experts in management have long documented the importance of goal
setting in worker motivation. In particular, they have found that when workers are
committed to challenging but attainable goals, their performance increases even if those
goals are not directly linked to wages. In this paper, we have introduced goal setting
in a principal agent model of managerial incentives. Agents care about goal setting
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because achieving those goals creates a sense of pride in accomplishment that modies
their intrinsic motivation to work. We have shown that, in an optimal contract, more
challenging objectives increase agentsperformance and that the goals set by the principal
increase with the agents standard. Therefore, goals that are payo¤ irrelevant, since they
do not directly a¤ect agentsextrinsic incentives, increase the principals prots. We have
also shown that a mid-ranged standard gives the highest satisfaction to an agent and that
a mid-ranged agent type could be the most satised among all the agent types. Therefore,
being very demanding can be detrimental.
There are some promising lines for future research. First of all, our goal commitment
function is a very simple one; an agent is committed to a goal when it exceeds his personal
standard su¢ ciently for him to consider the goal to be challenging. Psychologists have
found that there are other determinants of goal commitment that should be studied in an
economic model, such as the agentsself-e¢ cacy (i.e., ability condence) and the agents
participation in the goal setting processes (See Anderson et al. (2010) and Bush (1998)).
A very interesting line of future research is to endogenize the personal standard pa-
rameter. There are several ways to do this. First, in a model with di¤erent abilities we
can imagine that the agents standard is in part determined by his ability. Second, we
can think that the personal standard is determined by the agents rational expectation
about outcomes. This would provide a very good link between the present model with
goal dependent preferences and the reference dependent utility from expectations litera-
ture (such as models with preferences à la Köszegi and Rabin (2006)). In fact goal setting
provides an additional explanation of the formation of reference states. For instance, with
an experimental study Matthey (2010) nds evidence that apart from an individuals own
past, present and expected future outcomes and the outcomes of relevant others, reference
states also depend on environmental factors that do not inuence outcomes, i.e., they are
payo¤ irrelevant like the goals studied in this paper.
Another topic would be to introduce competition in the model. If we consider that
rms compete for workers, we should reconsider our result that very demanding (and
hence productive) agents may be the least satised. With competition we should have
two opposite e¤ects. On the one hand, we have the e¤ect studied in this paper that
very demanding workers may get lower satisfaction than lower types. But, on the other
hand, rms compete for more demanding agents o¤ering them higher wages, which has a
positive e¤ect on the satisfaction of very demanding agents.
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Finally, there is evidence that goal setting policies have more impact on agentsper-
formance as time goes by. In particular, Ivancevich (1974) nds that in a manufacturing
company a goal setting program signicantly improves workersperformance within six
months after implementation. Therefore, it would be interesting to extend our model to
allow for dynamic considerations. One possibility is to allow personal standards to be
positively related with past goals.
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Chapter II
Temptation, Horizontal
Di¤erentiation and Monopoly
Pricing
Abstract: We study the implications for pricing strategies and product
o¤erings of consumerstemptation when the di¤erentiation of the product is
horizontal. With horizontal di¤erentiation, the temptation state is represented
by a change in the consumersideal product on the Hotelling line, so that con-
sumers have two (possibly distinct) ideal products: one when committed and
another when tempted. The rm faces the following trade-o¤: for the con-
sumer who diverge the most between the ideal product with temptation and
commitment, if the rm positions a product close to the consumers temp-
tation ideal product, it increases the consumers surplus when tempted but
decreases surplus with commitment, which lowers the consumers incentive to
participate. This paper shows that, because of this trade-o¤, the rm may ex-
clude products that are too close to the temptation preferences in the optimal
menu. Moreover, it is shown that product diversity and rms prots decrease
with the probability of temptation and with the consumersawareness of their
dynamic inconsistency. (JEL: D11, D42, D82, L11, L12, L15)
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II.1 Introduction
Consumers temptation is an important characteristic of the consumer purchasing be-
havior. Many consumers establish ex-ante that they would like to commit to consuming
healthy, low calorie groceries. Nonetheless, ex-post temptation takes place and they mod-
ify their choices towards unhealthier alternatives. This behavior reects the dynamic
inconsistency of consumerspreferences commonly known as temptation. An important
implication is that when consumers are aware of their future change in preferences, they
are more willing to enter stores which do not carry unhealthy products in order to avoid
ex-post choices inconsistent with ex-ante preferences.
To capture this idea, Strotz (1955) and Kreps (1979) introduced a class of preferences
known as the "temptation representation". Let M denote the consumerschoice set and
U the utility function the commitment utility function that he has when making the
shopping list. The consumer anticipates that, once inside the store, his utility function
will change to V with a positive probability . Let xu denote the consumers choice with
U his commitment choiceand xv denote his choice with V his tempting choice. Then,
the consumers expected ex-ante utility is given by
W (M) = (1  )U (xu) + U (xv) :
In this setting a dynamic consistency problem arises because, while the consumer
would like to commit ex-ante to choosing xu, with probability , he ends up choosing xv.
We can interpret this preference representation as though the consumer had, ex-post, two
di¤erent possible selves: a tempted and a committed self.30
Although simplied, this representation is convenient for our purposes as it creates
an ex-ante demand for menus that implement commitment.31 Eliaz and Spiegler (2006)
considers a similar consumer representation.
30Note that this representation is quite extreme: if an agent falls into temptation he will forget about
the commitment preferences and choose according to the temptation preferences only.
31Some papers have studied other temptation representation. Gul and Pessendorfer (2001), for instance,
consider that consumers utility from a choice set equals the realized commitment utility minus the linear
"self-control costs", i.e., the realized temptation utility minus the maximum value of the temptation utility
over the choice set. Fudenberg and Levine (2005) allow for non-linear self-control costs, as they argue
that, with this model we can consider self-control as a limited resource such that the "cognitive load"
leads to agents falling into temptation more easily. Dekel, Lipman and Rustichinis (2005) representation
covers situations in which agents face uncertainty about the "strength of temptation". Finally, under
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A novel contribution of this paper is that we analyze a monopolists optimal pricing
problem when the product is horizontally di¤erentiated. This allows us to capture temp-
tation as a change in the consumers ideal product on the Hotelling line. We consider
a continuum of consumer types; each consumer type knows that he has two (possibly
distinct) ideal products on a Hotelling line, one when committed and another one when
tempted. In the basic model, we assume that all consumer types have the same temp-
tation ideal product, located at one extreme of the Hotelling line, but they di¤er when
committed. Continuing from our previous example, this assumption means that while
consumers prefer products with di¤erent calories when committed, they are only tempted
by high calories product. Later in the paper, as an extension, we study a generalization
of the temptation representation.
In our model, a monopolist sells several products that can di¤er in their location on
the Hotelling line and in pricing. Therefore, the rms problem is to decide which goods
to o¤er on the Hotelling line and charge a price for each one in such a way that expected
prots are maximized. Since consumers are aware of the dynamic inconsistency of their
preferences, when designing the optimal selling strategy the rm has to worry about
both their incentives to enter the store (ex-ante IR), and their incentives to participate
once inside (ex-post IR). Moreover, the rm must ensure that once inside the store, each
consumer chooses the product designed for himself (ex-post IC ).32
Using this model, we can understand the relationship between the consumerstempta-
tion and the rms optimal product design. Does temptation increase or decrease product
diversity? Do prices increase with temptation? Does it have welfare implications?
In the standard horizontal di¤erentiation model without temptation, the monopolist
o¤ers the ideal product of each consumer type. In our model, instead, the rm faces
the following trade-o¤: by positioning products closer to the temptation preferences,
it can increase its prots under the temptation state. However, it also decreases the
the Chatterjee and Krishna (2006) representation, the agent has two di¤erent selves and temptation is
thought of as the choice of a "virtual alternate self" or alter ego, who appears with a positive probability
which depends on the choice set. If the temptation probability is not menu-dependent this representation
coincides with the one that we use in our model.
32Eliaz and Spiegler (2004) use a model in which consumers and the rm have to sign a contract before
entering the store, thus they work with an ex-ante incentive compatibility constraint. In our model we
do not consider the possibility of the ex-ante contract, so consumers must decide, ex-post, which product
to choose from among all the available o¤ers in the stores menu.
By Joaquín Gómez Miñambres Page: 35
Essays on Behavioral Economics
consumersex-ante utility, especially for those with a greater distance between their ideal
products with commitment and temptation. Therefore, the rms optimal menu may
exclude products that are too close to the temptation preferences since otherwise these
consumers will not derive su¢ cient utility from entering the store. In equilibrium, two
types of consumers coexist: consumers with similar preferences in the two states, who
always consume the same product, and consumers with most diverging preferences, who
consume di¤erent products in di¤erent states. The size of the two consumer groups,
which is given by the degree of product diversity, and the rms prots decrease with the
probability of temptation.
In recent years, several authors have explored the implications of consumer temptation
on pricing. A paper related to our work is Esteban, Miyagawa and Shum (2006). Using
Gul and Pessendorfers (2001) preferences and a vertical di¤erentiation environment, they
construct a model in which a monopolist chooses the price and quality of the goods it
o¤ers the consumer once inside one store. Thus, as in the present paper, they restrict the
number of menus to one. As in our model, they nd that the rm is not better o¤when the
consumer operates under temptation and that the heterogeneity of the product o¤ered
may be bounded as a result. In other related papers, such as Esteban and Miyagawa
(2006a), the rm can o¤er multiple menus which allow the rm to earn more prots,
while Esteban and Miyagawa (2006b) consider a competitive framework in which each
rm can also choose several menus. Also using a vertical di¤erentiation setting, Eliaz and
Spiegler (2006) study a model in which dynamically inconsistent agents sign a contract
with a rm, using the same temptation representation used here. In contrast with our
model, they assume that while the rm correctly anticipates the consumersinconsistency,
consumers incorrectly believe that, with some probability, they are going to take actions in
accordance with their "commitment" preferences. This "non-common priors" assumption
is the source of the exploitative contracts that arise in equilibrium. In contrast, our
model assumes that consumers are perfectly aware of their dynamic inconsistency, i.e.,
they are "sophisticated" consumers. However, in Section 5, we extend our model to
consider "naive" consumers, as in the Eliaz and Spiegler model. We show that when
consumers are su¢ ciently naive, the monopolist can extract all the consumerssurplus.
The monopolist o¤ers a menu which would not be accepted by consumers if they had the
same priors as the rm. They enter the store attracted by the benets of an "imaginary
o¤er" that they (incorrectly) believe to be purchasing when committed.
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There are other papers that study mechanism design for consumers with time in-
consistent preferences, however they focus on present-biased preferences with hyperbolic
discounting. For instance, ODonoghue and Rabin (1999b) study the optimal contract
that the rm must o¤er to a worker who is naive, i.e., he is unaware of his dynamic in-
consistency. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) study a model with two kinds of goods:
investment goods with immediate costs and delayed benets, and leisure goods with im-
mediate benets but delayed costs. In equilibrium, rms price investment goods below
marginal costs and leisure goods above marginal costs. If consumers are fully aware of
their dynamic inconsistency, the agents achieve a socially e¢ cient solution, but if agents
are naive then the equilibrium is ine¢ cient. Saradis (2005) constructs a model in which
consumers form expectations not only about their future behavior but also about the rms
prices. The main result is that the more naive consumers are, the lower the monopolist
prots will be.
Finally, in contrast to our model some papers considers that the temptation proba-
bility is an endogenous variable. For instance, there are papers that study addition and
consumers with environmental cues. Laibson (2001), use a version of the Becker and Mur-
phy (1988) model of addition, including environmental cues that arise during each period
with some probability. Due to a cue, the more the agents consume today, the greater the
marginal utility tomorrow. Therefore, consumption is determined by the stock of past
consumption in each state of the world. Their results show that the probability of falling
into consumption due to a cue (temptation) decreases with the consumersdiscount fac-
tor, the value of the outside option, and the impact of current consumption on the stock
of consumption. Our model is not about environmental cues since in the consumers
representation used here, the temptation probability is an exogenous variable.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. In Section 3, we
study two important benchmarks: the time consistent preferences case, i.e., the standard
model in which the temptation probability is zero, and the time inconsistent preferences
case in which, ex-post, the only possible state is the temptation state. Section 4 charac-
terizes the monopolists optimal menu. Section 5 extends the model to cover the case of
non-common priors and more general specications of the consumerspreferences. Finally,
Section 6 concludes.
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II.2 The Model
Amonopolist can produce and sell several products in one store. Products are horizontally
di¤erentiated à la Hotelling on a segment of unit length. An o¤er from the seller is denoted
by x and is a pair (q; p), where q 2 [0; 1] represents the products location and p 2 R+
its price. A menu M is a compact subset of o¤ers M  R2: Let M = M [ (; 0) denote
the set of o¤ers available to the consumer, where (; 0) is the outside option which has a
price of zero. We assume consumers are perfectly informed about the o¤ers in the menu.
There is a set of consumers, each of them buying at most one product and deciding,
ex-ante, whether to enter the monopolists store. They can also choose to stay outside
the store, which we formalize as choosing the outside option NE = (; 0).
To model consumers behavior we use the "dual-selves" approach based on Strotz
(1995) and Kreps (1979). In particular, we consider that, before entering the store,
a consumer evaluates his ex-post decisions with his commitment utility function U ().
However, with a probability , a consumer makes ex-post decisions with his temptation
utility function V ().
We assume that  is the consumers commitment ideal product on the Hotelling line
which is distributed according to a uniform distribution with support [0; 1] : We also
assume that v = 0 is the consumers ideal product when tempted.33 Therefore, we
consider that, when tempted, all consumers have "extreme" preferences.34 Then, given a
typical menu M , the (ex-ante) surplus of a consumer type  if he enters the store is:
W
 
M ; 

= (1  )max
x2M
U (x; ) + U (xv; ) ;
where
xv = argmax
x2M
V (x) :
A consumer type  enters the store only if his ex-ante utility is positive. We call this
condition ex-ante IR. The interpretation is that, once a consumer is inside the store, he
will choose with probability (1   ) the best element in the menu with his commitment
utility, while with probability  he will choose with his temptation utility. From now on
we will refer to the former as the commitment state and to the latter as the temptation
state.
33In Section 5 we study more general specications of the temptation preferences.
34Note that v = 1 has a similar interpretation.
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Given a menu M , we dene the assignment function x () = (q () ; p ()) : [0; 1] ! M
that species for each type  2 [0; 1] the o¤er that he is expected to choose.
Denition 1 An o¤er x () = (q () ; p ()) is the commitment choice for con-
sumer  if x () = argmax
x2M
U(x; ).
Denition 2 An o¤er x (v) = xv = (qv; pv) is the tempting choice for the
consumer if x v = argmax
x2M
V (x):
Therefore, the tempting (resp., commitment) choice is the o¤er that a consumer is ex-
pected to choose in the temptation (resp., commitment) state. Note that since consumers
have the same ideal product when tempted, their choices under this state must be the
same. On the other hand, under commitment, consumers have di¤erent preferences so
their choices may di¤er.
We consider the following specication for the commitment and temptation utility
functions, respectively:
U(x; ) = s  p  t(q; ); (II.1)
V (x) = s  p  t(q; v); (II.2)
and normalize
U ((; 0); ) = V ((; 0)) = W (NE; ) = 0: (II.3)
This is the typical utility specication of a horizontal di¤erentiation model, where
s 2 R+ represents the maximum possible surplus enjoyed by consumers, and t (q; )
represents the transportation cost, which satises:
(i) Symmetry: t(q; ) = t(; q);
(ii) Non negativity: t(q; )  0;
(iii) Identity of indiscernibles: t(q; ) = 0 i¤ q = ;
(iv) Increasing in Euclidean distance: t(q1; 1)  t (q2; 2) i¤ j1   q1j  j2   q2j;
and,
(v) Strict Superadditivity: t (q; ) > t (q; z) + t (z; ) for all z 2 (q; ) :
Property (i) (iv) are standard properties used in any horizontal di¤erentiation model.
An important implication of (v), which we use in our analysis, is that jt1 (q; )j > jt1 (q; z)j
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for all z 2 (q; ). Hence, the marginal transportation cost increases in the distance between
 and q.35 An example of a transportation cost function which satises all properties (i)
(v) is the quadratic function: t (q; ) = (q   )2 :
For simplicity, we assume the market is fully covered, which, as standard, requires s
being su¢ ciently large.
The monopolists problem
The monopolists problem is to design a menu M = fx () ; xvg2[0;1] which maximizes
his prots subject to consumersparticipation and incentive compatibility constraints. For
simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost of production is equal to zero. Therefore,
the monopolists problem is given by
max
fx();xvg2[0;1]
(1  )
Z
p () d + pv
s.t., for all  2 [0; 1] ;
W (M ; ) = (1  )U (x () ; ) + U (xv; )  0; (Ex-ante IR)
U (x () ; )  0; (Ex-post U -IR)
V (xv)  0; (Ex-post V -IR )
U (x () ; )  U (y; ) for all y 2M; (Ex-post U -IC)
V (xv)  V (y) for all y 2M: (Ex-post V -IC)
Consumer type  will enter the store if W (M ; )  0. So, when the ex-ante IR
constraint is satised, consumers choose from M .36 The ex-post IR and IC are standard
constraints. As usual, ex-post IR says that a consumer is at least as well o¤ purchasing
from the menu as choosing the outside option. Finally, ex-post IC says that a consumer
of type  cannot be better o¤ by pretending to be another type in each state of the world.
The ex-post IR and IC constraints together imply that x () (resp., xv) is an optimal
choice for U(; ) (resp., V ()).
35Note that this works as a single crossing condition for all consumer types with  > q.
36Thus, it is assumed that if a consumer  is indi¤erent to choosing fromM orNE, i.e., ifW
 
M ; 

= 0,
he ends up choosing from M:
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In the following lemma we show that if the ex-ante IR and ex-post U IC constraints
are satised, consumers obtain a non-negative ex-post surplus.
Lemma II.1 Ex-ante IR and ex-post U   IC imply ex-post U   IR.
Proof. Ex-post U   IC tells us
U (x () ; )  U (y; ) for all y 2M: (II.4)
Since the market is covered, x () 2 M and thus equation (II.4) implies that for all
 2 [0; 1]
U (x () ; )  (1  )U (x () ; ) + U (xv; ) =W (M ; )  0; (II.5)
where the second inequality follows from ex-ante IR.
By Lemma 1 we know that, since the market is covered, when the monopolist designs
the optimal menu he only needs to worry about ex-ante IR, ex-post U   IC and ex-post
V   IR:
II.3 Benchmark Cases
In this section we study two benchmark specications that are particular cases of our
model. First, we study the case in which the temptation probability equals zero. That
is, consumers choices are always consistent. Second, we study the case in which the
temptation probability equals one. That is, all consumers anticipate that they will always
be tempted inside the store.
II.3.1 Time Consistent Preferences ( = 0)
Our utility representation allows for consumers to be evaluating both their ex-ante and
their ex-post decisions with their commitment utility. This is the case when the temp-
tation probability equals zero, so that our model becomes a standard horizontal di¤eren-
tiation model. In this standard model, by selling the set of consumersideal products,
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the rm can extract the entire surplus of each consumer type. Thus, in equilibrium, the
monopolist will o¤er the menuMFC = f; sg for all  2 [0; 1] : This is obviously a feasible
menu: All IR constraints are binding while all the IC constraints are slack.
However, as the temptation probability increases, the monopolist faces the following
trade-o¤s. Since the market is covered, product qv, which is to be consumed when con-
sumers are tempted, must be desirable ex-post, satisfying ex-post V   IR, but must be
such that consumers also want to enter the store with their ex-ante utility function. If
product qv is located closer to v, then it is the furthest away from the commitment ideal
products of some of the remaining consumers, and thus prices must be lower for the ex-
ante IR of these consumer types to be satised. This e¤ect gives the monopolist fewer
incentives to position qv at v. But then, consumer types closer to v will consume the
tempting product under commitment as well, which implies that the monopolist narrows
the variety of products he o¤ers when the temptation probability () increases.
II.3.2 Time Inconsistent Preferences ( = 1)
Assume now that the probability of temptation is such that consumers, once inside the
store, will purchase the tempting choice. Therefore, the monopolist only sells qv and his
maximization problem becomes
max
fqv ;pvg
pv
s.t., for all  2 [0; 1] ;
U (xv; )  0; (Ex-ante IR)
V (xv)  0: (Ex-post V   IR)
Since the market is covered, the ex-ante IR constraint must be satised for all  2
[0; 1] : As dU(x
v ;)
d
 0 ( 0) for all   qv (  qv) ; the binding constraints are the ex-ante
IR constraint for  = 1 and the ex-post V   IR constraint. It is then immediate to see
that the monopolist maximizes prots by positioning qv equidistantly between v = 0 and
 = 1: Thus, qv = 1
2
; and pv is set to extract the consumersentire ex-post surplus. In
equilibrium, the monopolist o¤ers the menu MFT =

1
2
; s  t  1
2
; v
	
:
In sum, if  = 0, the monopolist o¤ers the consumersideal products, whereas if  = 1,
the monopolist o¤ers a single product.
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II.4 Characterization of the Optimal Menu
In this section we compute the optimal menu of o¤ers for any . We start by deriving
some auxiliary results.
Note that ex-post incentive compatibility and superadditivity of t (q; ) imply q(b) 
q () for all b  . Moreover, since v = 0, it follows trivially that if x () = xv for some
consumer type  2 [0; 1], then x(b) = xv for all b  . Therefore, consumers purchasing
the same product in both states (i.e., x () = xv) are located closer to the temptation
preferences, v, than consumers who purchase di¤erent products in di¤erent states (i.e.,
x () 6= xv). Let us denote by k the lowest consumer type who buy the same product
in both states. In the following lemma we prove that the rm optimally o¤ers the ideal
commitment product for all consumer types with   k.
Lemma II.2 At the optimal menu q () =  for all  2 [k; 1] : Moreover, p () = p  pv,
for all  2 [k; 1] :
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is that by o¤ering the ideal commitment product for all
consumer types  2 [k; 1], their ex-ante surplus is increased. This allows the monopolist
to raise the prices of the products it o¤ers.
In equilibrium we have that x () = xv for all  < k while x () 6= xv for all   k:
For consumer k, U (x (k) ; k) = U (xv; k).
Moreover, by Lemma 2, we obtain the following monotonicity result:
for all   qv (  qv) ; dW
d
 0

dW
d
 0

:
The next lemma shows that the tempting choice coincides with the commitment choice
of consumer k.
Lemma II.3 In equilibrium, xv = (k; p) :
By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, it is obvious that, if V (xv) > 0 (resp.,W
 
M ; 1

> 0), it is
protable for the monopolist to increase qv (resp., decrease qv) and increase p. Therefore,
in equilibrium, V (xv) =W
 
M ; 1

= 0 must hold. Then,
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s  p   t (qv; 0) = (1  ) (s  p) +  (s  p   t (qv; 1)) = 0;
and
t (qv; 0) = t (qv; 1) : (II.6)
Based on the auxiliary results above, the next proposition fully characterize the opti-
mal menu.
Proposition II.1 At the optimal menu, the products o¤ered are x = (; p), for all
 2 [k; 1] :
Furthermore, the tempting choice (qv; pv) = (k; p) satises
t (qv; 0) = t (qv; 1) ;
and
pv = p = s  t (qv; 0) :
Note that these results give us noteworthy features of the optimal menu. Firstly, qv is
an increasing function of  with qv ( = 0) = 0 and qv ( = 1) = 1
2
, which coincides with
the full commitment and the full temptation benchmarks, respectively. Secondly, since
by Lemma 2, qv = k, as temptation probability increases fewer consumers make di¤erent
choices under di¤erent states, so product diversity decreases.
Fig. 1. Optimal Menu
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Moreover, since all products sold in the store are sold at the price p and the market
is covered, the rms prots are
 = p = s  t (qv; 0) :
Thus, product prices and monopolists prots decrease with . The intuition is that
since consumers are aware of their time inconsistency, a higher temptation probability
has to be compensated with lower prices to attract consumers into the store, which leads
to lower prots for the monopolist.
Finally, the consumersex-ante surplus is
W
 
M ; 

=
(
t (qv; 0)  t (qv; ) 8 2 [0; k]
[t (qv; 1)  t (qv; )] 8 2 [k; 1]
By Lemma 2, we know that qv = k; thus k is the only consumer type who consumes
his ideal product under both states, so it is not surprising that he gets the maximum
consumer surplus of all the consumer types.
Fig. 2. Ex-ante consumerssurplus
Moreover, we know that a higher temptation probability implies lower product prices
to attract consumer  = 1 into the store (i.e., W
 
M ; 1

= 0 needs to hold) which implies
that for all  2 (0; 1) ; W  M ;  increases with the temptation probability.
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II.5 Extensions
In this section we analyze two important extensions of our previous model. First, we
extend our setting to allow for non common priors. Second, we relax the assumption that
v is located at one extreme of the Hotelling line.
II.5.1 The Non-Common Priors Case
It is reasonable to think that in several situations, the rm has better knowledge about
consumerschange in tastes than consumers themselves. Like Eliaz and Spiegler (2006)
(ES from here on), we formalize this non-common priors idea assuming that the rm knows
that temptation occurs with probability one, while consumers believe that their prefer-
ences will not change with a positive probability (1  ) (i.e., they are naive). Therefore,
the monopolist now only cares about the prots from the tempting choice xv = (qv; pv)
and uses the commitment choices to induce consumers to enter the store (i.e., as a hook).
Since the monopolist wants to charge the highest pv; in this setting we still have
V (xv) = 0 in equilibrium, thus from the V   IC, it follows that
0 = V (xv)  V (x) = s  p  t (q; v) :
Moreover, the monopolist wants to charge the lowest possible p to induce consumers
to enter the store, which is p = s  t (q; v) :
In the next lemma we show that the monopolist o¤ers just one product to be consumed
under commitment.
Lemma II.4 At the optimal menu there is a single commitment choice for consumers
given by x = (1; s  t (1; 0)) : Consequently, k = 0.
The intuition behind Lemma 5 is that the rm wants to locate the commitment o¤er
as far from the tempting choice as possible in order to charge the highest possible price
under the temptation state. This implies that in equilibrium the commitment choice is
so attractive for committed consumers that all consumers  2 (0; 1] expect to choose x
under commitment.
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Since the monopolist wants to charge the highest possible pv, we want to check whether
charging pv = s (i.e., locating qv = v = 0) is feasible. The next lemma addresses this
issue and summarizes the equilibrium tempting choice.
Lemma II.5 At the optimal menu,
(i) xv = (qv; pv) = (0; s) for all   1
2
; and,
(ii) qv is given by the equation, t (qv; 1)  t (qv; 0) = 1 

t (1; 0) for all  > 1
2
.
When consumers believe that temptation occurs with a low probability
 
  1
2

, the
rm can extract the consumersentire surplus, positioning qv = 0. Note that, by the prop-
erties of the transportation cost function, the solution qv () is continuous and dq
v()
d
> 0
for all  > 1
2
. Moreover, when  = 1, we obtain the full temptation benchmark with
common priors. Figure 3 shows the equilibrium choices under both types of priors.
Fig. 3. Equilibrium with Common Priors (CP) and Non-Common Priors (NCP).
Therefore our results are similar in spirit to that of ES. Note that x is an "imaginary
o¤er" (or a hook): consumers believe that they will purchase it with a positive probability,
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whereas the rm knows that all consumers will end up purchasing xv once in the store.
The monopolist uses the imaginary o¤er to attract consumers into the store and it wants
to charge the lowest possible p. However, this price has a lower bound (p = s  t (1; 0))
due to the incentive compatibility constraints. When consumers believe that temptation
occurs with a low probability
 
 < 1
2

the monopolist can extract all of the consumers
surplus when they are tempted, and consumers nd it optimal to enter the store due to
the benets that they (incorrectly) expect to receive when committed. However, when
 is su¢ ciently large, the expected gains that consumer  = 1 expects to obtain under
commitment are lower than the expected losses that he expects to su¤er when tempted
if the tempting choice is xv = (0; s). Because of this, the monopolist has to design qv
su¢ ciently close to  = 1; otherwise, this consumer type will not derive a su¢ ciently high
ex-ante utility to entice him to enter into store.37
In our non-common priors case, the monopolist is o¤ering a menu which would not
be accepted by some consumer types if they had the same priors as him. Therefore, it is
obvious that the monopolist obtains higher prots in the non-common priors case than
in the common priors case. Moreover as with common priors, the price of the tempting
choice, and hence the monopolists prots, decrease with the temptation probability.
Let us now discuss the di¤erences between our analysis and that of ES. As in the
present paper, ES study a model in which a monopolist has to design a menu for dy-
namically inconsistent consumers. However, whereas here we consider a horizontal di¤er-
entiation model in which consumers di¤er in their commitment preferences, ES study a
vertical di¤erentiation model in which consumers di¤er only in their prior beliefs about
the future state. In ES equilibrium, sophisticated types (i.e., those with a high prior)
choose a contract which perfectly commits them to their commitment choice, while naive
types (i.e., those with a low prior) choose an exploitative contract, which is a contract
that gives them a negative utility under temptation state in accordance with their com-
mitment preferences (i.e., U (xv) < 0). Our results conrm that with a low  there is
exploitation in equilibrium (i.e., U (xv) < 0 for all  > 0). However, with our temptation
model we can provide more results. If  is high, the exploited consumers are those for
which the di¤erence between their ideal product when committed, , and the temptation
37As in the common priors case we are assuming that s is su¢ ciently large to cover the market. However
in this case there is an important di¤erence: when  < 12 , the rm wants to cover the market for any s,
the reason is that in this case the rm can attract even consumer  = 1 by o¤ering xv = (0; s).
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ideal product, v, is large. Moreover, the set of exploited consumers decreases as  in-
creases, because the rm has to design the tempting choice closer to their commitment
preferences.
II.5.2 Generalization of Temptation Preferences
In this section, we relax the assumption that consumers temptation ideal product is
a single point located at the extreme of the line. Firstly, we consider the case where
the consumerstemptation ideal product is located in the interior of the interval [0; 1].
Secondly, we study the case where, ex-ante, the agents face uncertainty about the ex-post
temptation ideal product.
General temptation ideal product 0  v  1
We next show that our previous results with v located at one extreme of the Hotelling
line can be easily extended to the case where 0  v  1: To understand this, we next
consider the case where v = 1
2
. Note that we can interpret this case as if faced with two
di¤erent standard cases where v is located at one extreme, one with  2 0; 1
2

and v = 1
2
and another one with  2 1
2
; 1

and v = 1
2
. Let qv (resp., qv) be the tempting choice
of the former (resp., the later) case. Applying our previous results, we know that the
tempting choice in each case is the one located closest to v and the commitment choice
satises q () =  for all  <qv and  > qv. Therefore, in this case we have two tempting
choices satisfying V (xv) = V (xv) = 0: Although consumers get the same utility from
consuming both tempting choices, we assume that consumer types  2 0; 1
2

consume xv
while consumer types  2 1
2
; 1

consume xv: Since qv satises, W
 
M; 0

= V (xv) = 0 in
equilibrium, t
 
qv; 1
2

= t
 
qv; 0

. Similarly, since qv satises W
 
M; 1

= V (xv) = 0 in
equilibrium, t
 
qv; 1
2

= t (qv; 1) : Graphically
Fig. 4. Optimal Menu when v = 1
2
.
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Since the tempting choices locations are farther away from v as the temptation prob-
ability increases, if v 6= 1
2
it is possible that for a su¢ ciently large , we get a corner so-
lution in qv = 0 or qv = 1; which implies that t
 
qv; v
  t (qv; v) or t  qv; v  t (qv; v)
respectively. In the following lemma we summarize this idea
Lemma II.6 Let 0  v  1, in equilibrium
(i) if v < 1
2
t (qv; v) = t (qv; 1) = t
 
qv; v

for all qv > 0;
t (qv; v) = t (qv; 1) > t
 
qv; v

for all qv = 0;
(ii) if v > 1
2
t
 
qv; v

= t
 
qv; 0

= t (qv; v) for all qv < 1;
t
 
qv; v

= t
 
qv; 0

> t (qv; v) for all qv = 1:
If v < 1
2
, consumer  = 1 has the lowest incentives to enter the store since his
commitment ideal product is the farthest away from his temptation ideal product, thus in
equilibrium we haveW
 
M; 1

= 0 to ensure consumersparticipation:Moreover, we know
that the tempting choices have to satisfy V (xv) = V (xv) = 0. Therefore, if qv > 0; in
equilibrium we have two tempting choices located equidistant from v; but, if  is so high
that it makes qv = 0; we have that t
 
qv; v
  t (qv; v) : Therefore, since the monopolist
has to make both tempting choices equally desirable for consumers when tempted, he has
to charge a lower price for qv. In particular we have that p = s t (qv; v)  s t (0; v) =p.
Since v > 1
2
is the symmetric case, the intuition would be the same.
Uncertainty about the consumerstemptation ideal product, v 2
h
0; 
v
i
A natural generalization of our model is to consider the case where v is not a single
point but rather it takes di¤erent values. In particular we consider that v is uniformly
distributed in the interval
h
0; 
v
i
, where 
v 2 (0; 1]. The interpretation is that both,
consumers and the monopolist, are unsure about the future temptation ideal product.
Let q be the product located closest to 0 on the Hotelling line. The following lemma
summarizes the equilibrium.
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Lemma II.7 Let v be uniformly distributed in
h
0; 
v
i
, the optimal menu is M = f; pg
for all  2 q; 1 ; where q satises
(1  ) t  q; 0+ 

v
 
qt
 
q; 0

+
Z v
q
t (q; 0) dq
!
=


v
"
qt
 
q; 1

+
Z v
q
t (q; 1) dq
#
for all q < 
v
;
t
 
q; 0

= t
 
q; 1

for all q > 
v
:
and
p =
8<: s  p   (1  ) t
 
q; 0
  

v

qt
 
q; 0

+
R v
q
t (q; 0) dq

for all q < 
v
;
s  t  q; 0 for all q > v:
Note that if q > 
v
the result is the same as in the original model, because tempted
consumers always choose q (i.e., qv =q). Thus, from equation (II.6), t
 
q; 0

= t
 
q; 1

.
However, if q< 
v
, every product in the interval
h
q; 
v
i
could be chosen under temptation
(i.e., qv 2
h
q; 
v
i
). Therefore, the consumersex-ante surplus is
W
 
M ; 

=
8<: s  p  (1  ) t
 
q; 
  

v

qt
 
q; 

+
R v
q
t (q; ) dq

for all  < q
s  p  

v

qt
 
q; 

+
R v
q
t (q; ) dq

for all  > q
Note that, knowing W
 
M ; 

, we only need to require W
 
M ; 0

= W
 
M ; 1

= 0 to
obtain Lemma 7:
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Fig. 5. Equilibrium location q.
As in the standard case, q is an increasing function of : However, note that qv =
q


v
= 0

 q


v
> 0

: The idea behind this is that, when q < 
v
, we do not just have
one possible tempting choice but a continuum of possible tempting choices in the intervalh
q; 
v
i
. Therefore, there are possible tempting choices located closer to  = 1, which gives
the consumer a greater ex-ante surplus. This implies that the monopolist can design q
closer to 0, which leads to higher product prices. Moreover, the greater 
v
is the farther
the location of the possible tempting choices will be. The monopolist can farther increase
the product prices by lowering q:
II.6 Conclusion
We have considered a model in which consumers face problems of temptation and self-
control, where temptation is modelled as a change of the consumers ideal product in
the Hotelling segment. We have studied the optimal menu designed by a monopolist.
In our basic model, consumers are perfectly aware of their dynamic inconsistency and
all consumers have the same temptation preferences. In this case, the optimal menu
is di¤erent from the one in a standard horizontal di¤erentiation model in the following
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sense. In equilibrium, the monopolist truncates the set of products o¤ered, not o¤ering
the products closest to the consumerstemptation ideal product. As a result the num-
ber of products o¤ered decreases with the temptation probability. As an extension, we
have studied the case in which consumers are only partially aware of their dynamic in-
consistency. In particular, following Eliaz and Spiegler (2006), we have studied the case
in which the monopolist knows that consumers will be tempted but consumers, instead,
believe incorrectly that they will be tempted with probability . We have shown that, if
 is su¢ ciently low, the monopolist o¤ers as many products as consumer types there are,
but if  is su¢ ciently high, the rm does not o¤er the products closest to the consumers
ideal products. Finally, we have studied a more general specication of the temptation
preferences and have shown that our main results remain true.
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Chapter III
Temptation, Horizontal
Di¤erentiation and Monopoly
Pricing: The Discrete Types Case
Abstract: In this paper, we characterize a monopolists optimal supply
decision when selling products that are horizontal di¤erentiated to consumers
who su¤er from temptation. This paper extends Gómez-Miñambres (2011b)
by analyzing the case of nite numbers of consumer types. We show that this
assumption modies the rms optimal pricing in a way that is not present in
a continuous types model. We nd that temptation not only restricts product
diversity, as it is shown in Gómez-Miñambres (2011b), but also distorts the
monopolists menu by not o¤ering the products the consumers would most
prefer. (JEL D11, D42, D82, L11, L12, L15)
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III.1 Introduction
Standard theories of monopoly pricing assume that consumers are free from temptation.
Nonetheless, we commonly observe that many consumers fall into temptation when they
take shopping decisions. In particular, some consumers, once in a store, fail to commit to
consume products they planned to buy ex-ante.
Theoretically we can formalize this kind of dynamic inconsistent preferences using the
"temptation representation" rst introduced by Strotz (1955) and Kreps (1979). Let X
and Y be two consumers choice sets. A consumer prefers the choice set X to another set
Y if and only if W (X) > W (Y ), where W is dened by,
W (M ; i) = (1  )max
x2M
U(x) + U(xv),
where
xv = argmax
x2M
V (x):
In this formulation the consumer has two di¤erent utility function: U and V . Utility
function U represents the preference that the consumer would like to commit to. For
instance, the desire to commit to consuming healthy, low calorie groceries. While utility
function V represents the consumers temptation, i.e., the desire to consume unhealthier
product alternatives.
In the eld of Industrial Organization, some papers have analyzed how rms would
modify their supply decision if selling to consumers who su¤er from temptation. This
literature, however, has assumed that products are di¤erentiated vertically ( see Esteban
et al. (2006)). Nonetheless, in the marketplace, we observe that some of the products
being o¤ered are horizontally di¤erentiated. With vertical di¤erentiation, all consumers
have the same quality ranking of the products. Instead, with horizontal di¤erentiation,
consumers diverge on what the ideal characteristics would be. One of the novelties of this
paper is to consider that products are horizontally di¤erentiated. Therefore, the temp-
tation state is represented by a change in the consumersideal product on the Hotelling
line.
The rms problem is to position a set of products on the Hotelling line and charge a
price for each one in such a way that expected prots are maximized. Since consumers
are aware of the dynamic inconsistency of their preferences, when designing the optimal
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selling strategy the rm has to worry about both their incentives to enter the store (ex-
ante IR), and their incentives to participate once inside (ex-post IR). Moreover, the rm
must ensure that once inside the store, each consumer chooses the product designed for
himself (ex-post IC ).38
In my companion paper, Gómez-Miñambres (2011b), we analyze a similar problem
where consumersideal products are continuously distributed. However, in many situa-
tions we can think that a discrete types model is more appropriate. For instance, rms
that o¤er "organic foods" usually divide consumers in segments or groups that di¤er in
their willingness to pay for di¤erent versions of the good according to his caloric com-
ponent.39 The present paper extends our previous work on temptation by considering a
nite number of consumer types. As we shall see, many of the techniques that we use to
solve the continuous types problem cannot be applied to this model. Notwithstanding,
some of the continuous types results are still valid. First, temptation decreases product
variety with respect to the standard horizontal di¤erentiation model with full commit-
ment. The idea is that for the consumers who diverge the most between the ideal product
with temptation and commitment, if the rm locates a product close to their temptation
ideal product, it increases their surplus in this state, but decreases their surplus with
commitment, which lowers the incentives to participate. Because of this, in the optimal
menu, the rm may exclude products that are too close to the temptation preferences.
However, consumer who are close to the temptation preferences may want to consume
the same product under both states of nature. As a result, in equilibrium, two types of
consumers coexist: those who have similar preferences when committed and tempted and
buy the same product in both states and those who have preferences that are most di-
vergent and that, as a result, buy di¤erent products when tempted and when committed.
Second, consumerstemptation decreases product prices and rm prots. Nevertheless,
having a nite number of consumer types creates a new source of distortion. In equilib-
rium, the rm o¤ers products that are not the consumersideal products. In other words,
temptation not only restricts product diversity but also distorts the monopolists menu
by not o¤ering consumersideal products. As we shall see in detail, in the core of this
38Eliaz and Spiegler (2004) use a model in which consumers and the rm have to sign a contract before
entering the store, thus they work with an ex-ante incentive compatibility constraint. In our model we
do not consider the possibility of the ex-ante contract, so consumers must decide, ex-post, which product
to choose from among all the available o¤ers in the stores menu.
39See Schi¤erstein & Ophuis (1998) and Batte et al. (2007).
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result is the supperadditivity of the transportation costs function.40 In contrast with the
standard horizontal di¤erentiation model, temptation makes that some of the incentive
compatibility constraints be binding in equilibrium.41 This implies that the monopolist
has to design o¤ers (prices and locations) tighted to these constraints. While a price
change induces a rst order e¤ect in the rms prots function, a change in location of a
product is of a higher order because of strict superadditivity. This implies that in some
situations it will be protable to adapt locations instead of modifying prices in order to
satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints.
Literature Review
In recent years, several authors have explored the implications of consumers having
preferences with temptation on a rms pricing and product o¤ering decisions. A pa-
per that relates to our work is Esteban, Miyagawa and Shum (2006). Using Gul and
Pessendorfers (2001) preferences and a vertical di¤erentiation environment, they con-
struct a model in which a monopolist chooses the price and quality of the goods it o¤ers
while selling a single menu to consumers who have preferences with temptation and self-
control. Thus, as in the present paper, they restrict the number of menus to one (in
addition to the outside good). As in our model, they nd that the rm is not necessarily
better o¤when the consumer operates under temptation and that the heterogeneity of the
product o¤ered may be bounded as a result. In other related papers, such as Esteban and
Miyagawa (2006a), the rm can o¤er multiple menus which allows the rm to earn more
prots, while Esteban and Miyagawa (2006b) considers a competitive framework in which
each rm can also choose several menus. Also using a vertical di¤erentiation setting, Eliaz
and Spiegler (2006) study a model in which agents with time inconsistent preferences sign
a contract with a rm, using the same temptation representation used here but consid-
ering di¤erent beliefs. In their paper, while the rm correctly anticipates the consumers
time inconsistent preferences, consumers incorrectly believe that with some probability
they will be making actions in accordance with their "commitment" preferences. This
"non-common priors" assumption is the source of the exploitative contracts that arise
40The superadditivity, or convexity, of the transportation costs function is a standard assumption in
almost all horizontal di¤erentiation models.
41In the standard horizontal di¤erentiation model with discrete types every consumer gets a zero surplus
in equilibrium, so all incentive compatibility constraints are slack.
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in equilibrium. In contrast, our model assumes that consumers make time consistent
decisionsthey are perfectly aware of their dynamic inconsistency.42
There are other papers that study mechanism design for consumers with time in-
consistent preferences, however they focus on present-biased preferences with hyperbolic
discounting. For instance, ODonoghue and Rabin (1999b) study the optimal contract
that the rm must o¤er to a worker who is naive, i.e., he is unaware of his dynamic in-
consistency. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) study a model with two kinds of goods:
investment goods with immediate costs and delayed benets, and leisure goods with im-
mediate benets but delayed costs. In equilibrium, rms price investment goods below
marginal costs and leisure goods above marginal costs. If consumers are fully aware of
their dynamic inconsistency, is obtained a socially e¢ cient solution, but if agents are naive
then the equilibrium is ine¢ cient. Saradis (2005) constructs a model in which consumers
form expectations not only about their future behavior but also about the rms prices.
The main result is that the more naive consumers are, the lower the monopolist prots
will be.
Finally, in contrast to our model some papers considers that the temptation proba-
bility is an endogenous variable. For instance, there are papers that study addition and
consumers with environmental cues. Laibson (2001), use a version of the Becker and Mur-
phy (1988) model of addition, including environmental cues that arise during each period
with some probability. Due to a cue, the more the agents consume today, the greater the
marginal utility tomorrow. Therefore, consumption is determined by the stock of past
consumption in each state of the world. Their results show that the probability of falling
into consumption due to a cue (temptation) decreases with the consumersdiscount factor,
the value of the outside option, and the impact of current consumption on the stock of
consumption. Our model is not about environmental cues as the temptation probability
is an exogenous variable.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. In Section 3,
we study two important benchmarks: the case with time consistent preferences, i.e., the
42In Gómez-Miñambres (2011c), we consider "naive" consumers, as in the Eliaz and Spiegler model. We
show that when consumers are su¢ ciently naive, the monopolist can extract the full consumerssurplus.
The monopolist o¤ers a menu that would be not accepted by consumers if they had the same priors.
They enter the store attracted by the benets of an "imaginary o¤er" that they (incorrectly) believe to
be purchasing when committed.
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standard model in which the temptation probability is zero, and the case with time incon-
sistent preferences in which temptation is the only possible state. Section 4 characterizes
the monopolists optimal menu. In Section 5 we study a model with three consumer types.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
III.2 The Model
The model description is similar to Gómez-Miñambres (2011b). A monopolist can pro-
duce and sell several products in one store. Products are horizontally di¤erentiated à la
Hotelling on a segment of unit length. An o¤er from the seller is denoted by x and is
a pair (q; p), where q 2 [0; 1] represents the products location and p 2 R+ its price. A
menu M is a compact subset of o¤ers M  R2: Let M = M [ (; 0) denote the set of
o¤ers available to the consumer, where (; 0) is the outside option which has a price of
zero. We assume consumers are perfectly informed about the o¤ers in the menu. For
expositional convenience we will refer to the menu as the store.
Consumers decide ex-ante whether, anticipating their ex-post choices, they enter the
monopolists store. Consumers can also stay outside the store, which we formalize as
choosing the outside option NE = (; 0).
To model consumersbehavior, we use the "dual-selves" approach in Strotz (1955)
and Kreps (1979). In particular, we consider that, before entering the store, a consumer
evaluates his ex-post decisions with his commitment utility function U (). However, with
a probability , the consumer makes ex-post decisions with his temptation utility function
V ().
The main novelty with respect to Gómez-Miñambres (2011c) is that, in this model,
there are a nite number of consumer types, N . consumers are heterogeneous in their
commitment preferences, which corresponds to heterogeneity in their ideal product. We
index commitment types by i; and parametrize them by i 2 [0; 1]. We assume there is a
fraction i =
1
N
of each type.43
All consumer types have ideal product v when tempted. We order types by 1 
N  :::  1  0, and restrict v = 0.44 Therefore, we assume that, when tempted, all
43The model can be easily extended to a non-uniform case.
44In my companion paper, Gómez-Miñambres (2011b), we study a generalization of the temptation
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consumers have "extreme" preferences.45 Then, given a typical menu M , the (ex-ante)
surplus of a consumer type i if he enters the store is:
W (M ; i) = (1  )max
x2M
U(x; i) + U(x
v; i),
where
xv = argmax
x2M
V (x):
Thus, once a consumer is inside the store, he will choose with probability (1   )
the best element in the menu with his commitment utility, while with probability  he
will choose with his temptation utility. From now on we will refer to the former as the
commitment state and to the latter as the temptation state.
A consumer type i enters the store only if his ex-ante utility, W (M ; i), is positive.
We call this condition ex-ante IR.
We introduce the following denitions:
Denition 1 An o¤er xi = (q (i) ; p (i)) is a commitment choice for consumer
i if xi = argmax
x2M
U(x; i):
Denition 2 An o¤er xv = (qv; pv) is a tempting choice for the consumer if
x v = argmax
x2M
V (x):
Therefore, the tempting (resp., commitment) choice is the o¤er that the consumer
is expected to choose in the temptation (resp., commitment) state. Note that since
consumers have the same ideal product when tempted, their choices under this state
must be the same. On the other hand, under commitment, consumers have di¤erent
preferences so their choices may di¤er.
We consider the following specication for the commitment and temptation utility
functions, respectively:
U(x; i) = s  p  t(q; i); (III.1)
V (x) = s  p  t(q; v); (III.2)
preferences.
45Note that v = 1 would have a similar interpretation in this model.
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and normalize,
U ((; 0); i) = V ((; 0)) = W (NE; i) = 0: (III.3)
This is the typical utility specication of a horizontal di¤erentiation model, where
s 2 R+ represents the maximum possible surplus enjoyed by the consumer and t (q; )
represents the transportation cost, which satises:
(i) Symmetry: t(q; ) = t(; q);
(ii) Non negativity: t(q; )  0;
(iii) Identity of indiscernibles: t(q; ) = 0 i¤ q = ;
(iv) t(q1; 1)  t (q2; 2) i¤ j1   q1j  j2   q2j; and,
(v) Strict Superadditivity: t (q; ) > t (q; z) + t (z; ) for all z 2 (q; ) :
Properties (i)   (iv) are standard properties in any horizontal di¤erentiation model.
Note that properties (ii) and (iii) imply positive semideniteness. Property (iv) says
that the transportation cost increases with the euclidean distance between  and q. An
important implication of (v), which we use in our analysis, is that jt1 (q; )j > jt1 (q; z)j for
all z 2 (q; ) : Hence, the marginal transportation cost is increasing in the distance between
 and q.46 An example of a transportation cost function that satises all properties is the
quadratic function: t (q; ) = (q   )2 :
Demand functions
Let L+1 be the number of products o¤ered that are di¤erent from the outside option,
and index all o¤ers by l, with l = 0; 1; :::; L, such that 1  qL  :::  q0  0.
Consumer type is demand for product l 2 f0; 1; :::; Lg in the commitment state is:
Dl (i) =
(
1 if xi = xl;
0 otherwise,
(III.4)
while his demand in the temptation state is:
Dvl =
(
1 if xv = xl;
0 otherwise:
(III.5)
For simplicity, we assume the market is fully covered, which, as standard, corresponds
to s being su¢ ciently large.
46Note that this works as a single crossing condition for all consumer types with i > q.
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The monopolists problem
Since we are in a discrete choice model, the number of products o¤ered by the mo-
nopolist (L+ 1) must be lower or equal to the number of consumer types (N + 1). Thus,
L  N: The monopolists problem is to design a menu M that maximizes prots subject
to the consumersparticipation and incentive compatibility constraints. We assume the
marginal cost of production is equal to zero. The monopolists problem is then given by:
max
fql;plgLl=0
(1  )

1
N
 LX
l=0
pl
NX
i=1
Dl (i) + p
v
s.t., for all i = 1; :::; N ,
W (M ; i) = (1  )U (xi; i) + U (xv; i)  0; (Ex-ante IR)
U (xi; i)  0; (Ex-post U -IR)
V (xv)  0; (Ex-post V -IR )
U (xi; i)  U (y; i) for all y 2M; (Ex-post U -IC)
V (xv)  V (y) for all y 2M: (Ex-post V -IC)
Consumer type i enters the store ifW (M ; i)  0. So, when the ex-ante IR constraint
is satised, the consumer chooses from M .47 The ex-post IR and IC are standard con-
straints. As usual, ex-post IR says that the consumer is at least as well o¤ purchasing
from the menu as choosing the outside option. Finally, ex-post IC says that a consumer
type i cannot be better o¤ by pretending to be another type in each state of the world.
The ex-post IR and IC constraints together imply that xi (resp., xv) is an optimal
choice for U(; i) (resp., V ()). If a consumer does not choose from M; he chooses from
NE = (; 0) :
In the following lemma we rst show that, if for some consumers the ex-ante IR and
ex-post U   IC constraints are satised, the consumer also gets a non-negative ex-post
surplus.
47Thus, it is assumed that if a consumer i is indi¤erent to choosing fromM orNE, i.e., ifW
 
M ; i

= 0,
he ends up choosing from M:
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Lemma III.1 Ex-ante IR and ex-post U   IC implies ex-post U   IR.
Proof. By ex-post U   IC it follows that
U (xi; i)  U (y; i) for all y 2M: (III.6)
Since the market is covered, xv 2M and equation (III.6) implies that for all  2 [0; 1]
U (xi; i)  (1  )U (xi; i) + U (xv; i) =W (M ; i)  0; (III.7)
where the second inequality follows from ex-ante IR. Q.E.D.
Because of Lemma 1, when the monopolist designs the optimal menu, it only needs to
worry about ex-ante IR, ex-post U   IC and ex-post V   IR:
III.3 Benchmark Cases
In this section, we study two benchmark specications that are particular cases of our
model. First, we study the case in which the temptation probability equals zero. That
is, consumerspreferences are time consistent. Second, we study the case in which the
temptation probability equals one. That is, all consumers anticipate that they will always
be tempted inside the store.
III.3.1 Time Consistent Preferences ( = 0)
Our utility representation implies that the consumer may evaluate both her ex-ante and
her ex-post decisions with her commitment utility. This is the case when the temptation
probability equals zero, so that our model becomes a standard horizontal di¤erentiation
model. In this standard model, by sellingN di¤erent products located at each of consumer
types ideal products, the rm can extract the entire surplus of each type. Thus, in
equilibrium, the rm o¤ers the menu MC = f(q1; p1) ; :::; (qN ; pN)g, such that:
(qi; pi) = (i; s) for all i 2 f1; :::; Ng :
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This is obviously a feasible menu. All IR constraints bind while all IC constraints are
slack.
As we shall see in detail in the next section, if the temptation probability is positive,
the monopolist faces di¤erent trade-o¤s. Since the market is covered, product qv, which
is to be consumed when consumers are tempted, must be desirable ex-post, satisfying
ex-post V   IR, but must be such that consumers also want to enter the store with their
ex-ante utility function. If product qv is located closer to v, then it is the farthest away
from the commitment ideal products of some of the remaining consumers, and thus prices
must be lower for the ex-ante IR constraint of these consumer types to be satised. This
e¤ect gives the monopolist fewer incentives to position qv on v. As this may imply that
consumer types closer to v consume the tempting product also under commitment, the
rm might sell fewer products when the temptation probability () increases.
It is also feasible that in equilibrium qi 6= i for some i. Namely, it is feasible that
for some consumer types their ex-ante ideal product be not o¤ered. To see this, assume
 2 (0; 1) and qN = N < 1: The rm must charge a low pN to attract consumer type
N into the store, but if N 1 is su¢ ciently close to N ; the rm has to charge also a
low pN 1, otherwise this consumer might nd more attractive product N than N   1.
In this case, the rm can do better by locating qN to the right of N , as t1 (qN ; N 1) >
t1 (qN ; N) > 0 because of strict superadditivity. Following this argument, it is feasible
that, in equilibrium, qi 6= i depending on the parameters of the model.48
III.3.2 Time Inconsistent Preferences ( = 1)
Assume now that the probability of temptation is such that consumers, once inside the
store, purchase the tempting choice. Therefore, the monopolist only sells qv and its
maximization problem is given by
max
fqv ;pvg
pv
s.t., for all i = 1; :::; N;
U (xv; i)  0; (Ex-ante IR)
V (xv; v)  0: (Ex-post V   IR)
48This is a new e¤ect that only arises with discrete types.
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Since the market is covered, the ex-ante IR constraint must be satised for all con-
sumer types. As U (xv; 1)  :::  U (xv; N), the binding constraints are the ex-ante
IR constraint for type N and the ex-post V   IR: It is then immediate that the rm
maximizes prots by locating qv equidistantly between v and N , i.e., qv = 
N
2
. The
rm sets pv to extract the entire ex-post surplus. In equilibrium, the rm o¤ers the menu
M I =
n
N
2
; s  t

N
2
; v
o
:
To summarize, under time consistent preferences ( = 0), the monopolist o¤ers the
consumersideal products whereas under time inconsistent preferences ( = 1) the mo-
nopolist o¤ers a single product.
III.4 Characterization of the Optimal Menu
We next derive general properties of the optimal menu for any  2 (0; 1) :
We rst note that ex-post incentive compatibility together with superadditvity of
t (q; ) imply q (i)  q (j) for all i  j. Moreover, since v = 0, it follows trivially
that if xi = xv for some consumer type i, then xj = xv for all consumer type j with
j < i: That is, the consumers who buy the same product under both states of nature,
are located closer to the temptation preferences than those who make di¤erent choices
under di¤erent states. Therefore, in equilibrium, the tempting choice is the one located
closest to v, thus xv = x0 = (q0; p0). Moreover, let us denote by k the lowest consumer
type such that xk 6= xv. We have that xi = xv for all i < k; while xi 6= xv for all i  k:
Let Uij denote the commitment utility of a consumer type i when he consumes the
commitment choice of consumer type j, and let Vi denote his temptation utility when
he consumes the commitment choice of consumer type i: With this notation, we refer to
ex-post Uij   IC as the condition stating that, under commitment, a consumer type i is
at least as well o¤ consuming xi as consuming xj. Similarly, we refer to ex-post Ui0  IC
as the condition that consumer type i is at least as well o¤ consuming xi as consuming
xv. Finally, we will refer to ex-post Vi  IC as the condition that the consumer is at least
as well o¤ consuming xv as consuming xi, when tempted.
In the next lemma, we show that the consumers get zero surplus when tempted.
Lemma III.2 At the optimal menu, ex-post V   IR binds, i.e., V (xv) = 0:
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We relegate the proof of this lemma to the Appendix, which also includes all the other
proofs not included in the text.
The intuition is the following: if consumers get a positive surplus when tempted, the
monopolist could move the tempting choices location to the right, decreasing V (xv) and
incrementing U (xv; k), which would permit an increase in prices. Therefore, in this
model, consumers can only receive a positive surplus in the commitment state.
Using Lemma 2 we can rewrite the ex-ante IR constraint of consumer i  k to obtain
that
U (xi; i)  
1   (t (q
v; i)  t (qv; v)) :
Thus, a consumer with a higher i must be deriving a higher ex-post commitment utility
inside the store. Consumers with a high i have very distant ideal products in the two
states of nature so they are more reluctant to enter the store because they anticipate
higher losses when tempted.
Because of this, the ex-ante surplus of the consumer type who is the farthest away
from his ideal product when tempted is, in fact, equal to zero. This is not an obvious
result as the ex-ante surplus is non-monotonic. One cannot ensure that W
 
M; i

is
decreasing (or increasing) in i:49 Given this observation, we prove the result by showing
that, in equilibrium, at least a consumer type will get an ex-ante surplus of zero. Since
by the aforementioned non-monotonicity, this consumer type could be di¤erent than N ,
we show that whenever this occurs there exists a protable deviation in which consumer
types with ideal products closer to N also get a zero ex-ante surplus.
Lemma III.3 At the optimal menu,
(a) The ex-ante IR condition of consumer type N binds, i.e., W
 
M; N

= 0:
(b) If   1
2
, then W
 
M; i

> 0 for all i 2 [k;N).
Note that Lemma 2 and Lemma 3:a imply that consumer types at the extremes of
the Hotelling segment, 0 and N , get zero surplus. Note that other consumer types may
also get zero ex-ante surplus, which complicates the analysis. In Lemma 3:b we show a
49In Gómez-Milambres (2011b) we prove that monotonicity prevails with continuous types, which
greatly simplies the analysis. As this is no longer true when there is a nite number of types, we here
have to apply di¤erent techniques in order to solve the model.
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useful result: if the temptation probability () is su¢ ciently high, all consumer types with
 2 (0; 1) get a positive ex-ante surplus. It implies that, in some situations, we should
worry only about two binding constraints in equilibrium, the ex-post V   IR (Lemma 2)
and the ex-ante IR of consumer type N (Lemma 3).
By explaining the set of possible IC constraints that need to be considered in equilib-
rium we next establish results which hold for any parametrization.
Proposition III.1 Let i  k and  2 (0; 1) ; in equilibrium,
(a) Either ex-post Uii 1   IC, or ex-post Uii+1   IC or ex-ante IR (i) is a binding
constraint for all i < N .
(b) The commitment choice for consumer i, xi, satises qi > i (resp., qi < i) if and
only if ex-post Ui 1i   IC binds (resp., not bind) and ex-post Ui+1i   IC does not bind
(resp., bind).
(c) The commitment choice for consumer i, xi, satises qi = i if and only if ex-post
Ui 1i   IC and ex-post Ui+1i   IC do not bind.
(d) k is the rst consumer type such that ex-post Uk 1k IC and/or ex-post Ukk 1 IC
do not bind.
Part (a) states that for every consumer type, either the ex-ante IR or one ex-post
IC constraint have to be binding in equilibrium. It is worth nothing that since qi  1;
this result may not apply to consumer N . In particular, if N = 1; ex-post UNN 1   IC
cannot be binding as the rm cannot locate qN to the right of N . Part (b) shows an
important result of the paper that we have anticipated in Section 2. The rm may nd
optimal to exclude some of the consumersideal products, i.e. qi 6= i for some i  k.
This is because, by locating the product at a di¤erent point than i; the rm can increase
the price of the product o¤ered to some of his neighbors. In particular, the rm locates
qi farther away from the neighbor who most value this product. This e¤ect introduces
a new source of distortion, which is not present in a continuos types model (see Gómez-
Miñambres (2011b)), namely that temptation not only restricts product diversity but also
distorts the monopolists menu by not o¤ering consumersideal products (i:e:; qi 6= i).50
Note (c) follows straightforwardly from (a) and (b). Moreover, since consumer type N
50We discuss this e¤ect in detail in Section 5.
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has no neighbors to his right, we have that qN  N . Finally, (d) indicates a very simple
way of identifying the cut-o¤ k, i.e., k is the rst consumer type for whom either ex-post
Uk 1k   IC or ex-post Ukk+1 bind.
Using the results discussed so far, it follows that the optimal menu solves:
max
fpv ;qv ;pi;qig
(1  )

1
N
" NX
i=k
pi +
k 1X
i=1
pv
#
+ pv;
subject to the constraints that for all types k  i < N and type j < k;
V (xv) = 0 (Ex-post V   IR)
W
 
M; N

= 0 (Ex-ante IR (N))
W
 
M; i
  0 (Ex-ante IR (i))
U (xv; v)  U (xk; v) (Ex-post U0k   IC)
U (xk; k)  U (xv; k) (Ex-post Uk0   IC)
U (xi; i)  U (xi+1; i) (Ex-post Uii+1   IC)
U (xi+1; i+1)  U (xi; i+1) (Ex-post Ui+1i   IC)
qn  1 (Feasibility)
In order to gain some intuitions, in the next section, we solve the three types case.
III.5 The Three Types Case
The previous section has allowed us to characterize important properties of the equilib-
rium. Nonetheless, nding the optimal contract remains a tedious exercise as we have to
study several cases depending on the location of the consumerstypes. In this section,
we solve the three types case. In order to obtain closed-form solutions, we assume the
quadratic transportation costs t (q; ) = (q   )2. Additionally, to simplify matters, we
assume that one consumer type is located at the right extreme of the Hotelling line, i.e.,
3 = 1. In the previous section we have argued that, if N = 1, then in equilibrium
qN = N = 1. Therefore, with this specication, we have q3 = 3 = 1.
The rm can o¤er either three, two or one product in equilibrium. Regarding the
location of products 1 and 2, we can check that when the rm o¤ers three goods, three
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cases can emerge in equilibrium: (1) q1 = 1 and q2 = 2, (2) q1 = 1 and q2 > 2 and (3)
q1 < 1 and q2 = 2. When two products are o¤ered, the only possible case is (4) q2 = 2.
Finally, if the rm only o¤ers one product we have (5) q3 = 3 = 1. In Figure 1, we plot
all the possible cases as a function of the models parameters: 1, 2 and .
Fig. 1. Equilibrium: Possible cases
First of all, note that the case in which no ideal commitment products other than N
are o¤ered cannot arise in equilibrium. The intuition is that the rm seeks to minimize
the distortion in the products locations created by the temptation state. Second, the
distortion of the optimal menu decreases with the temptation probability. Note that the
set of ideal products f1; 2g for which the optimal menu includes all the ideal products,
case (1), decreases with temptation. In fact, if the temptation probability is su¢ ciently
high the optimal contract is always distorted. Finally, as we discussed in Section 3:1, the
number of products in the optimal menu decreases with the temptation probability.
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In order to gauge some intuition, we proceed to solve a specic parametrization with
three consumer types: 1 = 0:4, 2 = 0:45 and 3 = 1.51 This parametrization is specially
appealing because all cases (1)   (5) arise depending on the temptation probability (see
Figure 2). This parametrization also yields important insights. Given the parameter
values, our ndings will not depend on the temptation probability. This allow us to discuss
the equilibrium and perform a comparative statics analysis in a direct and understandable
way.
In Figure 2, we depict the location of qv as a function of .
Fig 2. Equilibrium qv given 1 = 0:4, 2 = 0:45 and 3 = 1:
In Figure 2, we observe that k increases with the temptation probability. Therefore,
product diversity decreases with temptation. Remember that, as a benchmark (Section
3:1), we have considered the standard full commitment case ( = 0), in which the rm
o¤ers the consumersideal products. Therefore, it is not surprising that we obtain case (1)
when  is su¢ ciently low. However, as  increases, the rm has to compensate consumers
to attract them into the store. For that reason, the monopolist may have to decrease the
price of the products purchased under commitment. In our example, this e¤ect makes
product 2 so desirable for consumer 1 that the rm has to locate q2 at the right of 2
(i.e., farther away from 1) to satisfy ex-post U12   IC.52 Consequently, case (2) arises
51We have solved arbitrary three typescases (See Appendix of Chapter III).
52Remember that in Proposition 1:b, we have proved that if ex-post Ui 1i is the binding constraint
then qi > i.
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when  2 (0:1; 0:33). To understand why this is optimal, consider that the rm moves
its location of product 2 to q2 = 2. In this case, although the rm can increase p2, it
has to decrease p1 to satisfy ex-post U12   IC. The latter negative e¤ect dominates the
former positive e¤ect, and thus the rm increases prots by locating q2 > 2:As  increases
further, qv does increase also while pv decreases (Lemma 2). Therefore U (xv; 1) increases
until ex-post U10 IC binds. At this point, an increment on  makes the rm decrease p1
to satisfy incentive compatibility. Since p1 decreases, the utility of consumer 1 increases,
and the rm locates q2 closer to 2: When the temptation probability is su¢ ciently high
( = 0:33 in this example) ; U (x1; 2) is so high that ex-post U21   IC binds, and thus,
as  increases, the rm has to locate product 1 to the left of 1 (i.e., farther away from
2) to satisfy incentive compatibility (case (3)). Following this argument, when qv = q1
( = 0:63), consumer 1 purchases qv under both states of nature, and thus the cuto¤ is
k = 2 (case (4)): Finally, when qv = 2 ( = 0:83), all consumer types except 3 buy the
tempting choice also under commitment and the cuto¤ is k = 3 (case (5)).
III.6 Conclusion
We have considered a model in which consumerspreferences are subject to stochastic
temptation, where temptation is modeled as a change in the consumers ideal product
in the Hotelling segment. We study the optimal menu designed by a monopolist. In
equilibrium, the rm truncates the set of products o¤ered, not o¤ering the products
that would be most tempting to consumers. As a result the number of products o¤ered
decreases with the temptation probability. We have also shown that some consumers
ideal products may be not o¤ered, creating a product o¤erings distortion that is absent
in the continuous types model.
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Appendix of Chapter I
Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Proposition 1
Firstly we show the if part. Thus, given v (y; g), if si  s then dedg  0. Note that
si  s implies that  1 (g; si)  0. This, jointly with the complementarity condition, i.e.,
v12 (y; g)  0, imply that dUdedg  0 which means that dedg  0. Now we show the only if part,
if de

dg
 0 then si  s. Note that dedg  0 implies that e¤ort and goals are complements,
i.e., dU
dedg
 0, which, given v (y; g), implies that  1 (g; si)  0, i.e., si  s. Q:E:D:
Proof of Lemma 1
The proof is by way of contradiction. Let fw; gg be a contract such that y < g (i.e.,
v (y; g) < 0), so that V (y; g; s) =  (g; s) v (y; g) < 0 as  (g; s) > 0. The utility of the
agent in such a contract is
U = w + V (y; g; s)  c < w   c:
Because of this, one can design a contract

wd; gd
	
with gd < s (i.e.,  
 
gd; s

= 0)
and wd < w, which is feasible since Ud = wd   c  U; and gives larger prots to the
principal, as wd < w and yd = y. Q:E:D:
Proof of Lemma 2
Given a x pair of agentsstandards fsL; sHg, all the possible cases that can arise are:
(i)max fgL; gHg  sL; (ii) gL  sL < sH  gH ; (iii) sL < gL  sH < gH ; (iv)min fgL; gHg >
sH ; (v) gH < sL < gL; (vi) gL  sL  gH  sH ; (vii) sL  fgL; gHg  sH ; (viii) sL < gH <
sH < gL:
First we show that (vi) - (viii) will not emerge in an optimal contract. In (vi) - (viii),
V (yH ; gH ; sL) > 0 as gH > sL and we have
U (sL; sH) = wH + sLv (yH ; gH)  e
2
H
2
> wH   e
2
H
2
= U (sH ; sH) :
By Joaquín Gómez Miñambres Page: 73
Essays on Behavioral Economics
Therefore, as is standard in principal-agent models, in equilibrium, the optimal fw; gg
satises IR binding for the "low" type (here H) and IC binding for the "high" type (here
L), i.e., U (sH ; sH) = 0 and U (sL; sL) = U (sL; sH) > 0: However, the following contract
is feasible and yields higher prots to the principal
wd; gd
	
=
 
wdL; wH

;
 
gL; g
d
H
	
;
where gdH < sL (i.e., V (sL; sH) = 0), w
d
L =
e2L
2
< wL =
e2L
2
+ sLv (yH ; gH) and
 
ydL; y
d
H

=
(yL; yH). Consequently, (vi) - (viii) can be ruled out.
Regarding the remaining cases, note that only in case (iv) we may have positive
informational rents because gL > sH . In the other cases, (i) ; (ii), (iii) and (v), it is
immediate that, in equilibrium, the principal can extract the entire agents surplus so
that U (sH ; sH) = U (sL; sL) = 0. Therefore, the monotonicity condition, U (sH ; sH) 
U (sL; sL), is satised in all cases (i)  (v). Q:E:D:
Proof of Proposition 2
By IR and IC the contract fw; gg must satisfy U (sL; sL) = 0 and U (sH ; sH) =
U (sH ; sL). Therefore, U (sH ; sL) =  (gL; sH) v (yL; gL), where  (gL; sH) > 0 i¤ gL > sH .
Q:E:D:
Proof of Lemma 3
By Lemma 1, any optimal contract fw; gg satises V (yi; gi; si)  0, thus V (yi; gi; si)
is either positive or zero.
(i) First note that the if part, V (yi; gi; si) > 0 =) yi > si, follows straightforwardly.
We show the only if part by contradiction. Suppose that yi > si =) V (yi; gi; si) = 0.
For the low type we have yL > sL =) V (yL; gL; sL) = 0, thus gL  sL since
 (gL; sL) = 0. The following deviation is feasible and yields higher prots,
wd; gd
	
=
 
wdL; wH

;
 
gdL; gH
	
;
where gdL 2 (sL; sH) (i.e., V (yL; gL; sL) > 0 and V (yL; gL; sH) = 0), wdL = wL  
V (yL; gL; sL) and
 
ydL; y
d
H

= (yL; yH).
For the high type if yH > sH =) V (yH ; gH ; sH) = 0, thus gH  sH since  (gH ; sH) =
0. The following deviation is feasible and yields higher prots,
wd; gd
	
=
 
wL; w
d
H

;
 
gL; g
d
H
	
;
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where gdH  sH (i.e., V (yH ; gH ; sH) > 0), wdH = wH   V (yH ; gH ; sH) and
 
ydL; y
d
H

=
(yL; yH). Moreover Ud (sL; sL) = U (sL; sL) = 0 by Proposition 2:
(ii) First note that the if part, V (yi; gi; si) = 0 =) yi  si, follows straightforwardly.
We show the only if part by contradiction. Suppose that yi  si =) V (yi; gi; si) > 0, thus
si < gi since  (gi; si) > 0. Therefore yi < gi which leads to V (yi; gi; si) < 0. Q:E:D:
Proof of Corollary 1
Immediate from Lemma 3. Q:E:D:
Proof of Proposition 3
Under the condition of Corollary 1 we have that V (yi; gi; si) > 0 so that gi > si for
all i. Therefore we have four possible cases: (i) sL < gL < sM < gM < sH < gH , (ii)
sL < gL < sM < sH < min fgM ; gHg, (iii) sL < sM < min fgL; gHg < sH < gH and
(iv) sL < sM < gM < sH < min fgH ; gLg. However, case (iv) will not emerge in an
optimal contract because it does not satisfy incentive compatibility since U (sM ; sL) =
wL + sMv (yL; gL)  e
2
L
2
> wL + sLv (yL; gL)  e
2
L
2
= U (sL; sL).
Note that in case (i) agents do not get any intrinsic utility from imitate the oth-
ers. Therefore agents do not get informational rents and in equilibrium, U (sL; sL) =
U (sM ; sM) = U (sH ; sH) = 0. In case (ii) type H is committed to the goal of type M ,
therefore applying standard results in principal agent models we have that in equilibrium
U (sH ; sH) = gM ln

eM
gM

(sH   sM) > U (sM ; sM) = U (sL; sL) = 0. Finally in case (iii)
we have that type M is committed to the goal of type L. Therefore, in equilibrium,
U (sM ; sM) = gL ln

eL
gL

(sM   sL) > U (sH ; sH) = U (sL; sL) = 0. Q:E:D:
Proof of Proposition 4
I follow the same argument used in the proofs of Lemma 2 and Proposition 2. Q:E:D:
The Principal Agent Solution
The Optimal Contract when V (yi; gi; si) > 0 for all i 2 fL;Hg.
We rst solve the principal agent model under the condition of Corollary 1, i.e.,
V (yi; gi; si) > 0 for all i 2 fL;Hg. Therefore, cases (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 2 are
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the only possible cases. Note that now, depending on the location of gL we may have the
following cases in equilibrium.
Assume rst gL < sH . In this case the participation constraint is binding for both
agent types. Therefore, the principals problem simplies to:
max
feH ;gH ;eL;gLg
p(eH   wH) + (1  p) (eL   wL)
subject to
wL =
e2L
2
  sLgL ln

eL
gL

;
wH =
e2H
2
  sHgH ln

eH
gH

:
Denoting by e to the Eulers number, the solution of this problem is:
eH = 

1 +
sH
e

and gH =


e
2
(e+ sH) ;
eL = 

1 +
sL
e

and gL =


e
2
(e+ sL) :
Note that this case is not feasible when sH and sL are su¢ ciently close, i.e., if 

e
2
(e+ sL)  sH . Under this situation the principal may want to set gL = sH , so
that the high type agent still gets zero information surplus, this is the next situation
we analyze. By substituting in the principals problem gL by sH and solving the new
principals problem we get that the contract o¤ered to the high type is the same as the
previous case, while the contract o¤ered to the low type is
eL =
1
2

 +
p
2 + 4sLsH

and gL = sH :
Assume nally gL > sH : In this case the high type gets positive informational rents
in equilibrium, thus,
U (sH ; sL) = gL ln

eL
gL

(sH   sL) > U (sL; sL) = 0:
Therefore, the principals problem becomes:
max
feH ;gH ;eL;gLg
p(eH   wH) + (1  p) (eL   wL)
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subject to
wL =
e2L
2
  sLgL ln

eL
gL

;
wH =
e2H
2
  sHgH ln

eH
gH

+ gL ln

eL
gL

(sH   sL) :
The solution of this problem is the following:
eH = 

1 +
sH
e

and gH =


e
2
(e+ sH) ;
eL = 

1 +
sL   psH
(1  p) e

and gL =


e
2
e+
sL   psH
(1  p)

:
The Optimal Contract in the remaining cases.
Previously we have solved cases (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 2, here we proceed by solving
cases (i) ; (ii) and (v).
 Case (i): max fgL; gHg  sL:
In this case the intrinsic utility of both agent types is zero, thus
V (yi; gi; si) = 0 for all i 2 fL;Hg
Therefore, applying Proposition 2, we have that the principals problem is
max
feH ;yH ;eL;yLg
p(eH   wH) + (1  p) (eL   wL)
subject to
wL =
e2L
2
;
wH =
e2H
2
:
The solution of this problem is
eH = eL = ;
wH = wL =
2
2
:
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 Case (ii): gL  sL < sH  gH :
In this case we have that V (yH ; gH ; sH) = sHgH ln

eH
gH

> 0 while V (yL; gL; sL) = 0.
By Proposition 2 we know that in this case the high type gets zero informational rents.
Therefore, the principals problem is
max
feH ;yH ;eL;yLg
p(eH   wH) + (1  p) (eL   wL)
subject to
wL =
e2L
2
;
wH =
e2H
2
  sHgH ln

eH
gH

:
The solution entails
eL = ; eH = 

1 +
sH
e

;
with
gH =


e
2
(e+ sH) :
 Case (v): gH < sL < gL:
In this case we have that V (yH ; gH ; sH) = 0 while V (yL; gL; sL) = sLgL ln

eL
gL

> 0.
By Proposition 2 we know that in this case the high type gets zero informational rents.
Therefore, the principals problem is
max
feH ;yH ;eL;yLg
p(eH   wH) + (1  p) (eL   wL)
subject to
wL =
e2L
2
  sLgL ln

eL
gL

;
wH =
e2H
2
:
Whose solution is
eH = ; eL = 

1 +
sL
e

;
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with
gL =


e
2
(e+ sH) :
In the following graph we plot the equilibrium prots as a function of , to order all
the possible cases.
Figure 4. Prots as function of :
Since goals are an increasing function of , if we rank the cases with respect to ,
keeping the other parameters constant, we have that the rst case, i.e., the one that
emerges when  is very low, is case (i). The interior solution of this case emerges when
 2 (0; bsI), while if  2 (bsI ; bsII) we have a corner solution in which.gL = sL. After
this case we have either case (ii) or (v) depending on the other parameter values, it is
immediate to check that both cannot hold simultaneously. The interior solution of these
cases emerges when  2 (bsII ; bsIII), while if  2 (bsIII ; bsIV ) we have a corner solution, i.e.,
either gH = sH or gL = sL. Finally, when  is su¢ ciently high we have the cases studied
in the previous section, i.e., cases (iii) and (iv). The interior solution of case (iii) emerges
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when  2 (bsIV ; bsV ), if  2 (bsV ; bsV I) we have that gL = sH , and if  > bsV I we are in case
(iv) which is the only case in which the high type agent gets positive informational rents.
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Appendix of Chapter II
Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 2
We show that a gap with no products in
 
; 
  [k; 1] ; can be improved upon by
designing a product with bq 2  ;  : Let p be the price of the product  and p be the price
of product . Assume with no loss of generality that consumer b 2  ;  buys product
. Then product bx = b; bp where bp = maxnp+ tb;  ; p+ tb; o ; is feasible and
yields more prots. Thus, repeating this argument, we get that, in equilibrium, q () = 
for all  2  ;  :
Since q () =  for all   k by U   IC constraints we have that p () = p for all
  k:
Finally, by V   IC constraint, p   pv  t (qv; v)   t (k; v)  0; where the last
inequality follows from the fact that qv  k. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3
We show that, if qv < k; the monopolist nds it optimal to decrease k: By denition
of k, U (x (k) ; k) = U (xv; k) : Thus, using Lemma 2, pv = p   t (qv; k). Therefore,
the monopolists prots are
 = (1  ) (k (p   t (qv; k)) + (1  k) p)+ (p   t (qv; k)) = p t (qv; k) ( + (1  ) k) ;
where d
dk
< 0 for all qv < k: Thus, in equilibrium, qv = k, which implies pv = p by
incentive compatibility. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
Immediate from Lemmas 1-3. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose by contradiction that the monopolist designs commitment products in the
interval [; 1], where  2 [0; 1) : Then, for any commitment product, the price is p =
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s   t (; 0) ; which is unique by the incentive compatibility constraints: Therefore, the
ex-ante surplus of consumers with   k, is given by
W
 
M; 

=
(
(1  )  s  p  t (; )+  (t (qv; v)  t (qv; )) for all  < ;
(1  )  s  p+  (t (qv; v)  t (qv; )) for all   :
Since
dW(M;)
d
< 0, for all  > qv; the "worst consumer type" from the point of view of
the monopolist is  = 1. Note that by setting  = 1 the monopolist maximizes W
 
M; 1

and thus allows for the lowest qv which yields the highest price for the tempting product
and hence the highest prots.
Finally, note that since  = 1, p = s   t (1; 0), moreover since V (xv) = 0, pv =
s   t (qv; 0) : Therefore from the denition of k, U (x (k) ; k) = U (xv; k) we get that
k = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5
Since the monopolist wants to charge the highest possible pv; we need to check that
pv = s (i.e., locating qv = v = 0) is feasible. In our case, it is su¢ cient to check that
W
 
M; 
  0 for all  2 [0; 1]
W
 
M; 

= (1  ) (s  p  t (q; )) +  (s  pv   t (qv; )) :
Thus, applying Lemma 4 and letting pv = s
W
 
M; 

= (1  ) (s  (s  t (1; 0))  t (1; )) +  (t (0; 0)  t (0; ))
= (1  ) (t (1; 0)  t (1; ))  t (0; ) :
Note that
dW
 
M; 

d
= 0 if and only if
t0 (1; )t0 (0; )
 = 1  
Due to the properties of the transportation cost function, this implies that for all  2
[0; 1] ; 9 2 [0; 1] such that for all  <  ( > ), dW(M;)
d
> 0 (< 0) : Therefore, since
W (M; 0) = 0, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for W
 
M; 
  0 for all  2 [0; 1] is
that W
 
M; 1
  0: Since
W
 
M; 1

= (1  ) t (1; 0)  t (0; 1) ;
= (1  ) t (1; 0)  t (1; 0) ;
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thenW
 
M; 1
  0 i¤   1
2
: This implies that, when  > 1
2
, the monopolist has to locate
the tempting choice beyond v, i.e., qv > 0; which implies charging a pv < s to attract
consumer  = 1 into the store. Since W
 
M; 1

= 0, then
W
 
M; 1

= (1  ) t (1; 0)   (t (qv; 0)  t (qv; 1)) = 0
Thus
t (qv; 1)  t (qv; 0) = 1  

t (1; 0)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6
It su¢ ces to show (i) since (ii) is symmetric. If qv > 0, the result is trivial. If
qv = 0; note that t (qv; v)  t (0; v). If we consider the interval [v; 1], we can apply the
results of the standard case. Thus, in equilibrium, W
 
M; 1

= V (xv) = 0: Therefore,
t (qv; v) = t (qv; 1) : Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 7
Note that, in this case, the results of Section 4 (Lemma 2 and Lemma 3) are still
valid if we substitute qv for q: Thus, the optimal menu is M = (; p) for all  2 q; 1.
Moreover, as in Section 4, we have W
 
M; 0

= W
 
M; 1

= 0 in equilibrium: If q > 
v
,
there is just one tempting choice, i.e., qv = q. Therefore, using the previous condition
s  p   t  q; 0 = (1  ) (s  p) +   s  p   t  q; 1 = 0;
so that
t
 
q; 0

= t
 
q; 1

:
However, if q < 
v
, every product in
h
q; 
v
i
can be chosen under temptation depending
on the realization of v. For all v 2 0; q ; it follows that qv = q, whereas for all
v 2

q; 
v
i
, qv = v. Therefore, since W
 
M; 0

= W
 
M; 1

= 0 in equilibrium
s  p   (1  ) t  q; 0  

v
 
qt
 
q; 0

+
Z v
q
t (q; 0) dq
!
=
(1  ) (s  p) + 
 
s  p   1
v
"Z q
0
t
 
q; 1

dq +
Z v
q
t (q; 1) dq
#!
= 0:
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Thus,
(1  ) t  q; 0+ 

v
 
qt
 
q; 0

+
Z v
q
t (q; 0) dq
!
=


v
"
qt
 
q; 1

+
Z v
q
t (q; 1) dq
#
:
Finally, since W
 
M; 0

= 0, then
p =
8<: s  p   (1  ) t
 
q; 0
  

v

qt
 
q; 0

+
R v
q
t (q; 0) dq

for all q < 
v
;
s  t  q; 0 for all q > v:
Q.E.D.
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Appendix of Chapter III
Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose, by contradiction that,M = fxv; xk; :::; xNg is an optimal menu, with V (xv) >
0. We next show that there exists a feasible deviation for the monopolist that satises all
constraints and increases its prots. Consider the alternative menu cM = fbxv; xk; :::; xNg,
where the tempting o¤er bxv = (bqv; bpv) is such that bqv > qv; bpv > pv, with
V (bxv) = 0
and
U (bxv; k) = U (xv; k) : (III.8)
Note that, since V (xv) > 0, there always exists bxv that satises the conditions above.
Condition (III:8) ensures that cM satises ex-post Uk;0 IC and ex-ante IR (k). Because
of superadditivity, it is immediate that ex-ante IR is also satised for all i > k, and since
M jxv = cM jbxv, cM satises ex-post Uih   IC for i; h  k.
Lastly, since bpv > pv, M is not an optimal menu, which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3
Let us start with part (a). Suppose, by contradiction, that M = fxv; xk; :::; xNg is an
optimal choice by the monopolist, and that it is such that W
 
M; N

> 0. Note that
three cases can emerge as described next.
(I) W
 
M; i

> 0 for all i
Consider the alternative menu cM = fbxv; bxk; :::; bxNg ; where the o¤er bxi = (qi; bpi) is
such that bpi = pi + > pi for all i  k, and the tempting o¤er bxv = (bqv; bpv) is such thatbqv < qv; and bpv > pv, while V (bxv) = 0. By superadditivity, we can construct  > 0 such
that
U (bxv; j)  U (bxk; j) for all j < k; (Ex-post Uj;k   IC)
and
U (bxk; k)  U (bxv; k) : (Ex-post Uk;0   IC)
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Thus, the cut-o¤ k does not change with the deviation. Note that with cM the ex-
ante surplus of all consumer types i  k is lower but the rms prots are higher. The
rm modies the menu until the ex-ante surplus of a consumer type equals zero. If this
consumer type is N; we reach the desired contradiction. Otherwise, we move to cases (II)
or (III) :
(II) 0 = W
 
M ; j

< W
 
M ; i

for some j < k  i:
Since j < k; by Lemma 2 W
 
M ; j

= t (qv; v)  t (qv; j) :
Thus, W
 
M ; j

= 0 implies that t (qv; v) = t (qv; j). Since t (qv; i) > t (qv; j),
then U (xv; i) = t (qv; 
v)  t (qv; i) < 0. Consequently
U (xi; i)  
1   (t (q
v; i)  t (qv; v)) > 0 for all  > 0:
The monopolist can deviate by increasing prices bpi = pi +  > pi for all i  k so
that both ex-post Uih   IC for i; h  k and ex-post Ui0   IC hold, as ex-post IR (i) is
positive. Moreover, the increase in prices decreases the ex-ante IR (i). Thus, the rm
increases prices until the ex-ante surplus of A consumer type greater than k becomes zero:
If this consumer type is N; the existence of a protable deviation contradicts the assumed
optimally of M . Otherwise, we move to case (III) :
(III) W
 
M ; N

> W
 
M ; i

= 0 for some k  i < N:
Let us dene i as the consumer type closest to N who has an ex-ante surplus equal
to zero, i.e., W
 
M ; i

= 0: For this consumer type
U (xi; i) =

1   (t (q
v; i)  t (qv; v)) : (Ex-ante IR (i))
Instead, for all types j > i
U (xj; j)>

1   (t (q
v; j)  t (qv; v)) . (Ex-ante IR (j))
If qi = i; then we can increase prices bpj = pj +  > pj until some consumer type j
gets a zero ex-ante surplus. Note that this deviation satises ex-post Uij   IC trivially,
and that it satises ex-post Uji   IC since

1   (t (q
v; j)  t (qv; v))  
1   (t (q
v; i)  t (qv; v))  t (i; j) :
As the monopolist gets greater prots with this deviation than with M;we ran into a
contradiction.
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If qi < i, consider the alternative menu fM = fxv; :::; xi 1; exi; :::; exNg ; where the o¤erexj = (qj; epj) is such that epj > pj for all j > i; and the o¤er exi = (eqi; epi) is such that
i > eqi  qi, epi  pi; and
U (xi; i) = U (exi; i) ;
U (xi; i+1)  U (exi; i+1) :
There always exists fM satisfying ex-post Uij   IC, ex-post Uji   IC and the above
conditions. In other words, there exists a feasible fM . Since the monopolist gets greater
prots with fM than with M;we again reach a contradiction.
Finally, note that the monopolist can follow this procedure until the ex-ante surplus
of some consumer type located at the right of i equals zero.
If qi > i; consider the alternative menuM 0 = fxv; :::; xi 1; x0i; :::; x0Ng ; where the o¤er
x0j =
 
qj; p
0
j

is such that p0j > pj for all j > i; and the o¤er x
0
i = (q
0
i; p
0
i) is such that
i < q
0
i  qi, p0i  pi and
U (xi; i) = U (x
0
i; i) ; (III.9)
U (xi; i 1)  U (x0i; i 1) : (III.10)
Note that M 0 satises Ex-post Uij   IC, and that we can design x0i in such a way
that it also satises ex-post Uji   IC and the above conditions. Since M 0 is a feasible
deviation and the monopolist earns higher prots with M 0 than with M;we again reach
a contradiction.
As in the previous case, the monopolist can follow this procedure until the ex-ante
surplus of some consumer type located at the right of i equals zero.
Finally, note that we can repeat these form of deviations until i = N , so that
W
 
M ; N

= 0; as claimed in an optimal menu. Q.E.D.
Now we proceed to proof Lemma 3:b. First of all we have to note that qv  k. To
see this, let qv > k. We already know that qk  qv, thus, k  qv  qk: But note that
if qk > qv then pk < pv to satisfy ex-post Uk0   IC. Thus, the rm can decrease qk until
qv such that xk = xv; which obviously satises the rms constraints and increase prots.
However, this is incompatible with the denition of k. Thus, qv  k must hold.
Let M = fxv; xk; :::; xNg be an optimal menu. By Lemma 2 and Lemma 3
U (xN ; N) =

1   (t (q
v; N)  t (qv; v)) :
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Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists a consumer type i 2 [k;N) for whom
W
 
M ; i

= 0: Thus, by Lemma 2
U (xi; i) =

1   (t (q
v; i)  t (qv; v)) :
By ex-post ICiN   IC, we need U (xi; i)  U (xN ; i).

1   (t (q
v; i)  t (qv; N))  t (qN ; N)  t (qN ; i) ;
which contradicts superadditivity for all   1
2
since qv  i. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1.
We start by showing some useful incentive compatibility results, summarized in the
next lemma.
Lemma III.4 Let types j; i be such that j < k  i, then
(a) Ex-post Uk0   IC and ex-post Uik   IC imply ex-post Ui0   IC,
(b) Ex-post Vk   IC and ex-post Uki   IC imply ex-post Vi   IC,
(c) Ex-post Ujk   IC and ex-post Uki   IC imply ex-post Uji   IC, and
(d) Ex-post Ujk   IC imply ex-post Vk   IC:
Proof. (a) By ex-post U   IC
U (xi; i)  U (xk; i)  U (xv; k)  [t (q (k) ; i)  t (q (k) ; k)] ;
where the rst inequality follows from ex-post Uik   IC and the second one from ex-post
Ukj   IC.
Thus
U (xi; 
u
i )  s  pv   [t (qv; k) + t (q (k) ; i)  t (q (k) ; k)] > U (xv; i) ;
where the second inequality follows from superadditivity and the fact that qv = q0 < ql
for all l 6= 0.
(b) By ex-post V   IC and ex-post U   IC
V (xv)  V (xk)  U (xi; k)  [t (q (k) ; v)  t (q (k) ; k)] ;
where the rst inequality follows from ex-post Vk   IC and the second one from ex-post
Uki   IC.
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Thus
V (xv)  s  p (i)  [t (q (i) ; k) + t (q (k) ; v)  t (q (k) ; k)] > V (xi) ;
where the second inequality follows from superadditivity and the fact that q (i)  q (k) :
(c) Using ex-post U   IC, we get
U (xv; j)  U (xk; j)  U (xi; k)  [t (q (k) ; j)  t (q (k) ; k)] ;
where the rst inequality follows from ex-post Ujk   IC and the second one from ex-post
Uki   IC. Thus
U (xv; j)  s  p (i)  [t (q(i); k) + t (q (k) ; j)  t (q (k) ; k)] ;
where the second inequality follows from superadditivity and the fact that q (i)  q (k).
(d) Ex-post Ujk   IC implies U (xv; j)  U (xk; j). Thus
s  pv  s  p (k) + t (qv; j)  t (q (k) ; j) :
Moreover, ex-post Vk   IC yields V (xv)  V (xk). Therefore
s  pv  s  p (k) + t (qv; v)  t (q (k) ; v) :
Note that the following is true because of superadditivity
t (qv; j)  t (q (k) ; j)  t (qv; v)  t (q (k) ; v) ;
so the result follows.
Let ij be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the Ex-post Uij   IC; i be the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the ex-ante IR (i) and  be the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the feasibility constraint. Using the Khun-Tucker conditions of the rms
problem and applying Lemmas 1  4, we have that for all i < N it is satised that
(1  )

1
N
  i

+ (i 1i + i+1i)  (ii 1 + ii+1) = 0 (K-T 1)
t1 (qi; i 1)i 1i   t1 (qi; i) [(1  )i + ii 1 + ii+1] + t1 (qi; i+1)i+1i = 0 (K-T 2)
N 1N [t1 (qN ; N 1)  t1 (qN ; N)]  (1  )

1
N

t1 (qN ; N)   = 0 (K-T 3)
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
1   [t1 (q
v; N)  t1 (qv; v)]

1  

+ N 1N   NN 1

+
i [t (q
v; v)  t (qv; i)]  [t (qv; v)  t (qv; 1)]  t1 (qv; v) = 0 (K-T 4)
fij; i; g  0
where t1 () stands for the derivative with respect to the rst argument.
Using the equations above, we proceed to show the statements in the Proposition 1.
(a) From (K-T 1) if i = ii 1 = ii+1 = 0 then we have
1 
N
+ i 1i + i+1i > 0 for
all  < 1.
(b) By (a) we know that (1  )i+ii 1+ii+1 > 0. If i+1i = 0 and i 1i > 0; from
(K-T 2) it follows that
t1 (qi; i 1)i 1i   t1 (qi; i) [(1  )i + ii 1 + ii+1] = 0:
Therefore, since t1 (qi; i 1) > 0 for all qi > i 1; it is necessary that t1 (qi; i) > 0, i.e.,
qi > i:
(c) Similarly, if i+1i = i 1i = 0; it is necessary that t1 (qi; i) = 0, i.e., qi = i must
hold.
(d) Since, for all j < k , xj = xv; it is obvious that ex-post Uj 1j   IC and ex-post
Ujj 1 bind. Thus, j 1j > 0 and jj 1 > 0: Assume by contradiction that k 1k > 0 and
kk 1 > 0; so that
s  pk   t (qk; k) = s  pv   t (qv; k) ;
s  pv   t (qv; k 1) = s  pk   t (qk; k 1) :
Equalities above imply
t (qv; k)  t (qk; k) = t (qv; k 1)  t (qk; k 1) :
which, by strict superadditivity, is only possible when qk = qv, which implies pk = pv.
Therefore, xk = xv, which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
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The Three Types Case
In this appendix we solve the example with three types: 0 = v < 1 < 2 < 3 = 1;
 2 (0; 1), and t (q; ) = (q   )2. By Proposition 1, it is obvious that since q3  1, 3 = 1
implies that q3 = 1:
Applying Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 we know that in equilibrium V (xv) = 0 and
W (M; 3) = 0: Thus
pv = s  (qv)2 ;
p3 = s  
1   (1  2q
v) :
So that the rms problem is given by
max
fp1;p2;;q1;q2;qvg
1
3
(1  )

p1 + p2 + s  
1   (1  2q
v)

+(s  (qv)2 )
s.t.
(1  )  s  p1   (1   q1)2+  (1 (2qv   1))  0; (Ex-ante IR (1))
(1  )  s  p2   (2   q2)2+  (2 (2qv   2))  0; (Ex-ante IR (2))
0  s  p1   (q1)2 ; (Ex-post U01   IC)
s  p1   (1   q1)2  (qv)2   (1   qv)2 ; (Ex-post U10   IC)
s  p1   (1   q1)2  s  p2   (1   q2)2 ; (Ex-post U12   IC)
s  p2   (2   q2)2  s  p1   (2   q1)2 ; (Ex-post U21   IC)
s  p2   (2   q2)2  
1   (1  2q
v)  (1  2)2 ; (Ex-post U23   IC)

1   (1  2q
v)  s  p2   (1  q2)2 ; (Ex-post U32   IC)
Let ij be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the Ex-post Uij   IC; and i be
the Lagrange multiplier associated with the ex-ante IR (i). The Khun-Tucker conditions
are:
(1  )

1
3
  1

+ 01   10   12 + 21 = 0; (III.11)
(1  )

1
3
  2

+ 12   21   23 + 32 = 0; (III.12)
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q101 + (1   q1) (1 (1  ) + 10 + 12)  21 (2   q1) = 0; (III.13)
(q2   1)12 + (2   q2) (2 (1  ) + 21 + 23)  32 (1  q2) = 0; (III.14)

1  

1  
3
+ 23   32

+ 1 (1   10) + 22   qv = 0; (III.15)
1

(1  )  s  p1   (1   q1)2+  (1 (2qv   1)) = 0; (III.16)
2

(1  )  s  p2   (2   q2)2+  (2 (2qv   2)) = 0 (III.17)
01

p1 +
 
q21
  s = 0; (III.18)
10

s  p1   (1   q1)2   (qv)2 + (1   qv)2

= 0; (III.19)
12

p2   p1 + (1   q2)2   (1   q1)2

= 0; (III.20)
21

p1   p2 + (2   q1)2   (2   q2)2

= 0; (III.21)
23

s  p2   (2   q2)2   
1   (1  2q
v) + (1  2)2

= 0; (III.22)
32


1   (1  2q
v)  s+ p2 + (1  q2)2

= 0; (III.23)
f01; 10; 12; 21; 23; 32; 1; 2g  0 (III.24)
After applying Proposition 1, the following are the cases which satises all Khun-
Tucker conditions for some feasible parameters values:
(1) k=1; q1 = 1 and q2 = 2:
(i) 1 > 0; 2 > 0; 10 > 0; 01 = 12 = 21 = 23 = 32 = 0:
Since 10; 1 > 0 from (III.19) and (III.16) we get q
v = 1
2
and p1 = s.
Therefore using this in (III.11) to (III.15) we can get an expression for 1 > 0, 2 > 0
and 10 > 0:
Moreover since 2 > 0, from (III.17), we obtain
s  p2 = 
1   (2 (2   2q
v)) :
It is immediate that (III.18), (III.21) and (III.23) satisfy. Therefore, this case arises
as an equilibrium outcome when the parameter values satises: 1 > 0, 2 > 0, 10 > 0
and equations (III.20) and (III.22).
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(ii) 1 > 0; 2 = 0; 10 > 0; 23 > 0, 01 = 12 = 21 = 32 = 0:
The di¤erence with (i) lies in that 23 > 0, so that from (III.22) we obtain
s  p2 = 
1   (1  1)  (1  2)
2 :
It is immediate that (III.18), (III.21) and (III.23) hold. Therefore, this case arises as
an equilibrium outcome when the parameter values satisfy: 1 > 0; 23 > 0; 10 > 0 and
equations (III.17) and (III.20).
(iii) 1 = 0; 2 > 0; 10 > 0; 01 = 12 = 21 = 23 = 32 = 0:
From (III.11) and (III.12), we get 10 = 1 3 ; and 2 =
1
3
:
Using this in (III.15), we get qv = 1
3

1 + 2   1  1

:
Since 2 > 0, from (III.17) we obtain:
s  p2 = 
1   (2 (2   2q
v)) :
Note that since p2  s we need that qv < 22 :
Since 10 > 0; from (III.19), we get:
s  p1 = 1 (2qv   1) :
Since p1  s, we need that qv  12 : Moreover 01 = 0 holds when qv < 1:
For this case to be an equilibrium, the parameters values must satisfy (III.20), (III.21)
and (III.22).
(iv) 1 = 0; 2 > 0; 10 > 0; 23 > 0, 01 = 12 = 21 = 32 = 0:
Since 2 > 0 and 23 > 0, from (III.17) and (III.22), we obtain q
v = 1  (1 2)
2
:
Therefore using this in (III.11) to (III.15) we can get an expression for 2 > 0, 23 > 0
and 10 > 0:
Moreover since 10 > 0, from (III.19) we get:
s  p1 = 1 (2qv   1) :
Since p1  s, we need that qv  12 : Moreover 01 = 0 holds when qv < 1:
For this case to be an equilibrium, the parameters values must satisfy (III.20), (III.21).
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(v) 1 = 0; 2 = 0; 10 > 0; 23 > 0, 01 = 12 = 21 = 32 = 0:
From (III.11) and (III.12), we obtain 10 = 23 =
(1 )
3
:
Substituting this in (III.15) we get qv = 1
3

2  1 

1

:
Since 23 > 0, from (III.22)
s  p2 = 
1   (1  2q
v)  (1  2)2 :
Since p2  s, we need that 1  (1  2qv)  (1  2)2 :
Moreover since 10 > 0, from (III.19) we get
s  p1 = 1 (2qv   1) :
Since p1  s, we need that qv  12 : Moreover 01 = 0 hold when qv < 1:
For this case to be an equilibrium, the parameters values must satisfy (III.20), (III.21).
(2) k=1; q1 = 1 and q2 > 2:
(i) 1 > 0; 2 > 0; 10 > 0; 12 > 0, 01 = 21 = 23 = 32 = 0:
Since 10; 1 > 0 from (III.19) and (III.16), we get q
v = 1
2
and p1 = s:
Moreover since 12; 2 > 0 from (III.17) and (III.20), we get

1   (2 (2   2q
v)) + (q2   2)2 = (q2   1)2 :
Therefore using this in (III.11) to (III.15) we can get an expression for 1 >, 2 > 0;
10 > 0; 12 > 0 and q2 > 2:
For this case to be an equilibrium, the parameters values must satisfy (III.22).
(ii) 1 > 0; 2 = 0; 10 > 0; 12 > 0, 23 > 0, 01 = 21 = 32 = 0:
Since 10; 1 > 0 from (III.19) and (III.16), we get q
v = 1
2
and p1 = s:
Moreover since 12; 23 > 0, from (III.20) and (III.22), we obtain

1   (1  2q
v)  (1  2)2 = (q2   1)2   (q2   2)2 :
Therefore using this in (III.11) to (III.15) we can get an expression for 1 > 0, 23 > 0;
12 > 0; 10 > 0 and q2 > 2:
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(iii) 1 = 0; 2 > 0; 10 > 0; 12 > 0, 01 = 21 = 23 = 32 = 0:
Since 10 > 0; from (III.19), we get
s  p1 = 1 (2qv   1) :
Since p1  s, we need that qv  12 : Moreover 01 = 0 satises when qv < 1:
Since also 12; 2 > 0, from (III.19), (III.20) and (III.17), we obtain
1 (2q
v   1) = 
1   (2 (2   2q
v)) + (q2   2)2   (q2   1)2 :
Therefore using this in (III.11) to (III.15) we can get an expression for 2 > 0; 12 > 0;
10 > 0;
1
2
 qv < 1 and q2 > 2:
For this case to be an equilibrium, the parameters values must satisfy (III.21) and
(III.22).
(iv) 1 = 0; 2 > 0; 10 > 0; 12 > 0, 23 > 0, 01 = 21 = 32 = 0:
Since 10 > 0; from (III.19), we get
s  p1 = 1 (2qv   1) :
Since p1  s, we need that qv  12 : Moreover 01 = 0 satises when qv < 1:
Since 2 > 0; from (III.17), we get
s  p2 = 
1   (2 (2   2q
v)) + (q2   2)2 :
Moreover since 12; 23 > 0, we obtain
1 (2q
v   1) = 
1   (1  2q
v) + (q2   2)2   (1  2)2   (q2   1)2 :

1   (2 (2   2q
v)) =

1   (1  2q
v)  (1  2)2 :
Therefore using this in (III.11) to (III.15) we can get an expression for 2 > 0; 12 > 0;
23 > 0; 10 > 0;
1
2
 qv < 1 and q2 > 2:
For this case to be an equilibrium, the parameters values must satisfy (III.21).
(v) 1 = 0; 2 = 0; 10 > 0; 12 > 0, 23 > 0, 01 = 21 = 32 = 0:
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Since 10 > 0; from (III.19), we get
s  p1 = 1 (2qv   1) :
Since p1  s, we need that qv  12 : Moreover 01 = 0 satises when qv < 1:
Moreover since 12; 23 > 0, we obtain
1 (2q
v   1) = 
1   (1  2q
v) + (q2   2)2   (1  2)2   (q2   1)2 :
Therefore using this in (III.11) to (III.15) we can get an expression for 12 > 0; 23 > 0;
10 > 0;
1
2
 qv < 1 and q2 > 2:
For this case to be an equilibrium, the parameters values must satisfy (III.17) and
(III.21).
(3) k=1; q1 < 1 and q2 = 2:
(i) 1 = 0; 2 > 0; 10 > 0; 21 > 0, 01 = 12 = 23 = 32 = 0:
Since 10 > 0; from (III.19), we get
s  p1   (q1   1)2 = 1 (2qv   1) :
Since p1  s, we need that qv  12 : Moreover 01 = 0 satises when qv < q1 < 1:
Moreover, since 21; 2 > 0, using (III.19), (III.21) and (III.17), we obtain

1   (2 (2   2q
v)) = 1 (2q
v   1) + (q1   1)2 :
Therefore using this in (III.11) to (III.15) we can get an expression for 2 > 0; 21 > 0;
10 > 0 and 12  qv < q1 < 1:
For this case to be an equilibrium, the parameters values must satisfy (III.20) and
(III.22).
(ii) 1 = 0; 2 > 0; 10 > 0; 21 > 0, 23 > 0, 01 = 12 = 32 = 0:
Since 10 > 0; from (III.19), we get
s  p1   (q1   1)2 = 1 (2qv   1) :
Since p1  s, we need that qv  12 : Moreover 01 = 0 satises when qv < q1 < 1:
By Joaquín Gómez Miñambres Page: 96
Essays on Behavioral Economics
Since 2 > 0, from (III.17), we get
s  p2 = 
1   (2 (2   2q
v)) :
Moreover since 21; 23 > 0; we obtain

1   (2 (2   2q
v)) = 1 (2q
v   1) + (q1   1)2   (2   q1)2 :

1   (2 (2   2q
v)) =

1   (1  2q
v)  (1  2)2 :
Therefore using this in (III.11) to (III.15) we can get an expression for 2 > 0; 21 > 0;
10 > 0; 23 > 0 and 12  qv < q1 < 1:
For this case to be an equilibrium, the parameters values must satisfy (III.20).
(iii) 1 = 0; 2 = 0; 10 > 0; 21 > 0, 23 > 0, 01 = 12 = 32 = 0:
Since 10 > 0; from (III.19), we get
s  p1   (q1   1)2 = 1 (2qv   1) :
Since p1  s, we need that qv  12 : Moreover 01 = 0 satises when qv < q1 < 1:
Moreover since 21; 23 > 0; we obtain

1   (1  2q
v)  (1  2)2 = 1 (2qv   1) + (q1   1)2   (2   q1)2 :
Therefore using this in (III.11) to (III.15) we can get an expression for 21 > 0; 10 > 0;
23 > 0 and 12  qv < q1 < 1:
For this case to be an equilibrium, the parameters values must satisfy (III.22) and
(III.17).
(iv) 1 = 0; 2 = 0; 10 > 0; 21 > 0, 01 = 12 = 23 = 32 = 0:
Using (III.11) to (III.15) we can get an expression for 21 > 0; 10 > 0 and 12  qv <
q1 < 1:
Since 10 > 0; from (III.19), we get
s  p1   (q1   1)2 = 1 (2qv   1) :
Since p1  s, we need that qv  12 : Moreover 01 = 0 satises when qv < q1 < 1:
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Moreover since 21 > 0 and p2  s; we need that
1 (2q
v   1) + (q1   1)2  (2   q1)2 :
For this case to be an equilibrium, the parameters values must satisfy (III.22) and
(III.17).
(4) k=2; q2 = 2:
(i) 1 = 0; 2 > 0; 01 > 0; 10 > 0; 12 = 21 = 23 = 32 = 0:
From (III.11) to (III.15) we get qv = 
1+2
[1 + 2] :
Where we need: 1 < qv < 22 :
(ii) 1 = 0; 2 > 0; 01 > 0; 10 > 0; 21 > 0, 12 = 23 = 32 = 0:
Since 2; 21 > 0; from (III.17) and (III.21) we get q
v = 2
2
and p2 = s.
Using this in (III.11) to (III.15) we can get an expression for 2 > 0; 01 > 0; 10 > 0;
21 > 0.
For this case to be an equilibrium, the parameters values must satisfy (III.22).
(iii) 1 = 0; 2 > 0; 01 > 0; 10 > 0; 23 > 0, 12 = 21 = 32 = 0:
Since 2; 23 > 0; from (III.17) and (III.22) we get

1   (2 (2   2q
v)) =

1   (1  2q
v)  (1  2)2 :
Using this in (III.11) to (III.15) we can get an expression for 2 > 0; 01 > 0; 10 > 0;
23 > 0 and qv:
For this case to be an equilibrium, the parameters values must satisfy (III.21).
(iv) 1 = 0; 2 = 0; 01 > 0; 10 > 0; 21 > 0, 12 = 23 = 32 = 0:
Using (III.11) to (III.15) we can get an expression for 01 > 0; 10 > 0; 21 > 0 and
qv:
Since 21 > 0; from (III.21), we get
s  p2 = 2 (2qv   2) :
Since p2  s, we need that qv  22 : Moreover 12 = 0 satises when qv < q1 < 1:
For this case to be an equilibrium, the parameters values must satisfy (III.22).
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(v) 1 = 0; 2 = 0; 01 > 0; 10 > 0; 23 > 0, 21 > 0; 12 = 32 = 0:
Since 21; 23 > 0, from (III.21) and (III.22),.we get
qv =
(1  )
 + (1  ) 2

2   (1  2)
2 (1  )

:
Using this in (III.11) to (III.15) we can get an expression for 01 > 0; 10 > 0; 21 > 0:
Since 21 > 0; from (III.21), we get
s  p2 = 2 (2qv   2) :
Since p2  s, we need that qv  22 : Moreover 12 = 0 satises when qv < q1 < 1:
(vi) 1 = 0; 2 = 0; 01 > 0; 10 > 0; 23 > 0, 12 = 21 = 32 = 0:
Using (III.11) to (III.15) we can get an expression for 01 > 0; 10 > 0; 23 > 0 and
1 < q
v < q2:
For this case to be an equilibrium, the parameters values must satisfy (III.20) and
(III.21).
(5) k=3.
(i) 1 = 0; 2 = 0; 01 > 0; 10 > 0; 12 > 0, 21 > 0, 23 = 32 = 0:
Using (III.11) to (III.15) we can get an expression for 01 > 0; 10 > 0; 12 > 0,
21 > 0 and qv:
(ii) 1 = 0; 2 = 0; 01 > 0; 10 > 0; 12 > 0, 21 > 0, 23 > 0, 32 = 0:
Since 23 > 0, from (III.22), we get
(qv)2   (2   qv)2 = 
1   (1  2v)  (1  2)
2 ;
thus,
qv = 1  1
2 ( + (1  ) 2) :
Using this expression in (III.11) to (III.15) we can get an expression for 01 > 0;
10 > 0; 12 > 0, 21 > 0, 23 > 0:
In the picture below, we can observe which is the relevant case depending on all
parameters of the model.
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Fig. 2. Equilibrium: Possible cases
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